相关论文: Strategic Contention Resolution with Limited Feedb…

In this paper, we study contention resolution protocols from a game-theoretic perspective. In a recent work, we considered acknowledgment-based protocols, where a user gets feedback from the channel only when she attempts transmission. In…

We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of $n \geq 2$ identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of $k \geq…

\emph{Contention Resolution} is a fundamental symmetry-breaking problem in which $n$ devices must acquire temporary and exclusive access to some \emph{shared resource}, without the assistance of a mediating authority. For example, the $n$…

This paper focuses on the contention resolution problem on a shared communication channel that does not support collision detection. A shared communication channel is a multiple access channel, which consists of a sequence of synchronized…

Contention resolution addresses the problem of coordinating access to a shared channel. Time proceeds in slots, and a packet transmission can be made in any slot. A packet is successfully sent if no other packet is also transmitted during…

We examine deterministic broadcasting on multiple-access channels for a scenario when packets are injected continuously by an adversary to the buffers of the devices at rate $\rho$ packages per round. The aim is to maintain system…

A number of stations, independently activated over time, is able to communicate by transmitting and listening to a shared channel in discrete time slots, and a message is successfully delivered to all stations if and only if its source…

We provide a game-theoretic analysis of consensus, assuming that processes are controlled by rational agents and may fail by crashing. We consider agents that \emph{care only about consensus}: that is, (a) an agent's utility depends only on…

We propose a contention-based random-access protocol, designed for wireless networks where the number of users is not a priori known. The protocol operates in rounds divided into equal-duration slots, performing at the same time estimation…

Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept for reasoning about self-interested agents. We address the problem of synthesizing Nash equilibria in two-player deterministic games on graphs, where players have private, partially-ordered…

We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…

Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…

Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in…

Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…

We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…

Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…

We study decentralized equilibrium selection in stochastic games under severe information and communication constraints. In such settings, convergence to equilibrium alone is insufficient, as stochastic games typically admit many equilibria…

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…

A frequent problem in settings where a unique resource must be shared among users is how to resolve the contention that arises when all of them must use it, but the resource allows only for one user each time. The application of efficient…

This paper investigates the implementation and performance of a decentralized information transmission mechanism in game with complete or incomplete games. We propose a mechanism that realizes irrational correlated equilibria or irrational…