相关论文: Redividing the Cake

Incorporating fairness criteria in optimization problems comes at a certain cost, which is measured by the so-called price of fairness. Here we consider the allocation of indivisible goods. For envy-freeness as fairness criterion it is…

We study the problem of fair division of a set of indivisible goods with connectivity constraints. Specifically, we assume that the goods are represented as vertices of a connected graph, and sets of goods allocated to the agents are…

\textit{Fair division} of resources among competing agents is a fundamental problem in computational social choice and economic game theory. It has been intensively studied on various kinds of items (\textit{divisible} and…

The incorporation of fairness into the distribution network (DN) planning and operation has become a key goal of recent studies. The cost of implementing fairness, denominated the price of fairness (PoF), covers the efficiency that is…

We study an online model of fair division designed to capture features of a real world charity problem. We consider two simple mechanisms for this model in which agents simply declare what items they like. We analyse several axiomatic…

We initiate the study of fair distribution of delivery tasks among a set of agents wherein delivery jobs are placed along the vertices of a graph. Our goal is to fairly distribute delivery costs (modeled as a submodular function) among a…

In this paper, I argue that counterfactual fairness does not constitute a necessary condition for an algorithm to be fair, and subsequently suggest how the constraint can be modified in order to remedy this shortcoming. To this end, I…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical, additive valuations but individual budget constraints. Here, the indivisible goods--each with a specific size and value--need to be allocated such that the…

A cake has to be divided fairly among $n$ agents. When all agents have equal entitlements, it is known that such a division can be implemented with $n-1$ cuts. When agents may have different entitlements, the paper shows that at least $2 n…

We study the fair division of indivisible goods with conflicts between pairs of goods, represented by a graph $G = (V, E)$. We consider ``soft'' conflicts: assigning two adjacent goods to the same agent is allowed, but we seek allocations…

In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that…

We consider the problem of partitioning an undirected graph (representing a social network) over $n$ nodes and max degree $\Delta$ into $k$ equally sized parts. Each node in the graph, representing an agent, derives utility proportional to…

Rankings of people and items are at the heart of selection-making, match-making, and recommender systems, ranging from employment sites to sharing economy platforms. As ranking positions influence the amount of attention the ranked subjects…

Most of the existing algorithms for fair division do not consider externalities. Under externalities, the utility an agent obtains depends not only on its allocation but also on the allocation of other agents. An agent has a positive…

This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional…

The potential harms of algorithmic decisions have ignited algorithmic fairness as a central topic in computer science. One of the fundamental problems in computer science is Set Cover, which has numerous applications with societal impacts,…

We study fair resource allocation under a connectedness constraint wherein a set of indivisible items are arranged on a path and only connected subsets of items may be allocated to the agents. An allocation is deemed fair if it satisfies…

In this article we suggest a model of computation for the cake cutting problem. In this model the mediator can ask the same queries as in the Robertson-Webb model but he or she can only perform algebraic operations as in the Blum-Shub-Smale…

We introduce a model of fair division with market values, where indivisible goods must be partitioned among agents with (additive) subjective valuations, and each good additionally has a market value. The market valuation can be viewed as a…

The classical house allocation problem involves assigning $n$ houses (or items) to $n$ agents according to their preferences. A key criterion in such problems is satisfying some fairness constraints such as envy-freeness. We consider a…