相关论文: Generalized Second Price Auction with Probabilisti…
We provide efficient estimation methods for first- and second-price auctions under independent (asymmetric) private values and partial observability. Given a finite set of observations, each comprising the identity of the winner and the…
In many settings, money is a tool of exchange with minimal inherent utility --- agents will spend it in a way that maximizes the value of goods received subject to reasonable constraints, giving only second-order consideration to the…
In this paper, spectrum access in cognitive radio networks is modeled as a repeated auction game subject to monitoring and entry costs. For secondary users, sensing costs are incurred as the result of primary users' activity. Furthermore,…
Modern distribution matching algorithms for training diffusion or flow models directly prescribe the time evolution of the marginal distributions between two boundary distributions. In this work, we consider a generalized distribution…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
To support a freight carrier in a combinatorial transport auction, we proposes an exact and two heuristic strategies for bidding on subsets of requests. The exact bidding strategy is based on the concept of elementary request combinations.…
For revenue and welfare maximization in single-dimensional Bayesian settings, Chawla et al. (STOC10) recently showed that sequential posted-price mechanisms (SPMs), though simple in form, can perform surprisingly well compared to the…
Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from…
Search auctions have become a dominant source of revenue generation on the Internet. Such auctions have typically used per-click bidding and pricing. We propose the use of hybrid auctions where an advertiser can make a per-impression as…
Secondary spectrum auction is widely applied in wireless networks for mitigating the spectrum scarcity. In a realistic spectrum trading market, the requests from secondary users often specify the usage of a fixed spectrum frequency band in…
In this paper we introduce the so-called Generalized Naive Bayes structure as an extension of the Naive Bayes structure. We give a new greedy algorithm that finds a good fitting Generalized Naive Bayes (GNB) probability distribution. We…
Designing an incentive-compatible auction mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's revenue while minimizes the bidders' ex-post regret is an important yet intricate problem in economics. Remarkable progress has been achieved through…
We present a number of models for the adword auctions used for pricing advertising slots on search engines such as Google, Yahoo! etc. We begin with a general problem formulation which allows the privately known valuation per click to be a…
The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produces a sequence of actions whose time-average is a…
We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that provides $m^{\frac 1 2 -\epsilon}$ approximation to the social welfare and uses value queries only must use…
A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism…
Simultaneous item auctions are simple procedures for allocating items to bidders with potentially complex preferences over different item sets. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder submits bids on all items simultaneously. The allocation…
One significant challenge in cognitive radio networks is to design a framework in which the selfish secondary users are obliged to interact with each other truthfully. Moreover, due to the vulnerability of these networks against jamming…
Sponsored Search Auctions (SSAs) arguably represent the problem at the intersection of computer science and economics with the deepest applications in real life. Within the realm of SSAs, the study of the effects that showing one ad has on…
We present a deterministic exploration mechanism for sponsored search auctions, which enables the auctioneer to learn the relevance scores of advertisers, and allows advertisers to estimate the true value of clicks generated at the auction…