相关论文: On the Hardness of Signaling

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…

This article studies the value of information in route choice decisions when a fraction of players have access to high accuracy information about traffic incidents relative to others. To model such environments, we introduce a Bayesian…

Information design in an incomplete information game includes a designer with the goal of influencing players' actions through signals generated from a designed probability distribution so that its objective function is optimized. We…

In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with…

To what extent can an external observer observing an equilibrium action distribution in an incomplete information game infer the underlying information structure? We investigate this issue in a general linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework. A…

We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player…

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing…

Algorithms for equilibrium computation generally make no attempt to ensure that the computed strategies are understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest poker agents are represented as massive binary files. In…

A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or persuasion -- looks to improve equilibria by providing…

This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by a Markov…

Every interaction of a living organism with its environment involves the placement of a bet. Armed with partial knowledge about a stochastic world, the organism must decide its next step or near-term strategy, an act that implicitly or…

We study an information design problem in transportation networks, in the presence of a random state that affects the travel times on the links. An omniscient system planner -- aiming at reducing congestion -- observes the network state…

When users lack specific knowledge of various system parameters, their uncertainty may lead them to make undesirable deviations in their decision making. To alleviate this, an informed system operator may elect to signal information to…

This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who…

An important challenge in non-cooperative game theory is coordinating on a single (approximate) equilibrium from many possibilities - a challenge that becomes even more complex when players hold private information. Recommender mechanisms…

In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…

We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…

This paper considers linear quadratic team decision problems where the players in the team affect each other's information structure through their decisions. Whereas the stochastic version of the problem is well known to be complex with…

Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…

When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the…