相关论文: Optimal Energy Procurement from a Strategic Seller…
Standard procurement models assume that the buyer knows the quality of the good at the time of procurement; however, in many settings, the quality is learned only long after the transaction. We study procurement problems in which the…
We study the optimal design of electricity contracts among a population of consumers with different needs. This question is tackled within the framework of Principal-Agent problems in presence of adverse selection. The particular features…
A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's private type and also an unknown state of nature. An…
A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism in…
A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…
We study the algorithmic problem faced by an information holder (seller) who wants to optimally sell such information to a budged-constrained decision maker (buyer) that has to undertake some action. Differently from previous, we consider…
As the number of prosumers with distributed energy resources (DERs) grows, the conventional centralized operation scheme may suffer from conflicting interests, privacy concerns, and incentive inadequacy. In this paper, we propose an energy…
We consider users which may have renewable energy harvesting devices, or distributed generators. Such users can behave as consumer or producer (hence, we denote them as prosumers) at different time instances. A prosumer may sell the energy…
The advent of intelligent agents who produce and consume energy by themselves has led the smart grid into the era of "prosumer", offering the energy system and customers a unique opportunity to revaluate/trade their spot energy via a…
Among the many challenges of integrating renewable energy sources into the existing power grid, is the challenge of integrating renewable energy generators into the power systems economy. Electricity markets currently are run in a way that…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
We consider a seller who offers services to a buyer with multi-unit demand. Prior to the realization of demand, the buyer receives a noisy signal of their future demand, and the seller can design contracts based on the reported value of…
We consider some crucial problems related to the secure and reliable operation of power systems with high renewable penetrations: how much reserve should we procure, how should reserve resources distribute among different locations, and how…
We consider the problem of optimal trading for a power producer in the context of intraday electricity markets. The aim is to minimize the imbalance cost induced by the random residual demand in electricity, i.e. the consumption from the…
We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximization problem, a seller with a set of goods faces a set of…
How should a buyer design procurement mechanisms when suppliers' costs are unknown, and the buyer does not have a prior belief? We demonstrate that simple mechanisms - that share a constant fraction of the buyer utility with the seller -…
An auction house cannot generally provide the optimal auction technology to every client. Instead it provides one or several auction technologies, and clients select the most appropriate one. For example, eBay provides ascending auctions…
In this paper we formulate a contract design problem where a primary license holder wishes to profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it to potential secondary users/buyers. It needs to determine how to optimally price the…
We consider a monopoly information holder selling information to a budget-constrained decision maker, who may benefit from the seller's information. The decision maker has a utility function that depends on his action and an uncertain state…
Retail electrical power marketers, also known as retailers, typically set up contracts with suppliers to secure electricity at fixed prices on the one hand and with end users to meet their load requirements at agreed rates on the other…