相关论文: Making Decisions Using Sets of Probabilities: Upda…

We consider how an agent should update her uncertainty when it is represented by a set P of probability distributions and the agent observes that a random variable X takes on value x, given that the agent makes decisions using the minimax…

We consider how an agent should update her uncertainty when it is represented by a set $\P$ of probability distributions and the agent observes that a random variable $X$ takes on value $x$, given that the agent makes decisions using the…

It is common to use minimax rules to make decisions for planning when there is great uncertainty on what will happen in the future. Minimax regret is one popular version of this. We give an analysis of the behaviour of minimax rules in the…

Calibration has emerged as a foundational goal in ``trustworthy machine learning'', in part because of its strong decision theoretic semantics. Independent of the underlying distribution, and independent of the decision maker's utility…

We study a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision-maker. The decision-maker verifies these forecasts using a calibration test based on past data. How should the expert send forecasts to maximize her payoff…

Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is not known by other agents, nor is it known by the mechanism…

In imperfect-information games, agents must make decisions based on partial knowledge of the game state. The Belief Stochastic Game model addresses this challenge by delegating state estimation to the game model itself. This allows agents…

We present a model for studying communities of epistemically interacting agents who update their belief states by averaging (in a specified way) the belief states of other agents in the community. The agents in our model have a rich belief…

We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…

We model the joint distribution of choice probabilities and decision times in binary choice tasks as the solution to a problem of optimal sequential sampling, where the agent is uncertain of the utility of each action and pays a constant…

In this article, I investigate the use of Bayesian updating rules applied to modeling social agents in the case of continuos opinions models. Given another agent statement about the continuous value of a variable $x$, we will see that…

We propose a method for an agent to revise its incomplete probabilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional information is observed. In this work, an agent's beliefs are represented by a set of probabilistic formulae -- a belief base.…

In this paper, we consider one aspect of the problem of applying decision theory to the design of agents that learn how to make decisions under uncertainty. This aspect concerns how an agent can estimate probabilities for the possible…

We characterize the optimal reward functions (scoring rules) that incentivize an agent to acquire information and report it truthfully to the principal. The optimal scoring rules let the agent make a simple binary bet in single-dimensional…

In imperfect information games (e.g. Bridge, Skat, Poker), one of the fundamental considerations is to infer the missing information while at the same time avoiding the disclosure of private information. Disregarding the issue of protecting…

It has been shown that one can accommodate data (Bayes) and constraints (MaxEnt) in one method, the method of Maximum (relative) Entropy (ME) (Giffin 2007). In this paper we show a complex agent based example of inference with two different…

This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…

Consider discrete-time linear distributed averaging dynamics, whereby agents in a network start with uncorrelated and unbiased noisy measurements of a common underlying parameter (state of the world) and iteratively update their estimates…

Agents interacting with an incompletely known world need to be able to reason about the effects of their actions, and to gain further information about that world they need to use sensors of some sort. Unfortunately, both the effects of…

I propose a framework for an agent to change its probabilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional information $\alpha$ is observed. Traditionally, belief change occurs by either a revision process or by an update process, depending…