相关论文: Nash equilibrium for coupling of CO2 allowances an…

In this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of…

We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic…

We develop a tractable equilibrium model for price formation in intraday electricity markets in the presence of intermittent renewable generation. Using stochastic control theory, we identify the optimal strategies of agents with market…

We present a novel model of a coupled hydrogen and electricity market on the intraday time scale, where hydrogen gas is used as a storage device for the electric grid. Electricity is produced by renewable energy sources or by extracting…

Electricity markets differ in their ability to meet power imbalances in short notice in a controlled fashion. Relatively flexible markets have the ability to ramp up (or down) power flows across interties without compromising their ability…

The decarbonization of the power sector plays a pivotal role in economy-wide decarbonization to set the world on track to limit warming to 1.5{\deg}C by 2050. Carbon emission markets can play a significant role in this transition by putting…

We develop a model for the industry dynamics in the electricity market, based on mean-field games of optimal stopping. In our model, there are two types of agents: the renewable producers and the conventional producers. The renewable…

Uncertainty in the output power of large-scale wind power plants (WPPs) can face the electricity market players with undesirable profit variations. Market players can hedge themselves against these risks by participating in forward…

We consider a two-stage market mechanism for trading electricity including renewable generation as an alternative to the widely used multi-settlement market structure. The two-stage market structure allows for recourse decisions by the…

Nash equilibrium is a common solution concept that captures strategic interaction in electricity market analysis. However, it requires a fundamental but impractical assumption that all market participants are fully rational, implying…

We study an energy market composed of producers who compete to supply energy to different markets and want to maximize their profits. The energy market is modeled by a graph representing a constrained power network where nodes represent the…

To enhance decarbonization efforts in electric power systems, we propose a novel electricity market clearing model that internalizes the allocation of emissions from generations to loads and allows for consideration of consumer-side carbon…

This paper proposes a novel energy sharing mechanism for prosumers who can produce and consume. Different from most existing works, the role of individual prosumer as a seller or buyer in our model is endogenously determined. Several…

We consider users which may have renewable energy harvesting devices, or distributed generators. Such users can behave as consumer or producer (hence, we denote them as prosumers) at different time instances. A prosumer may sell the energy…

We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for $k$- price auctions. We also introduce a new type of auction and demonstrate that it has fair solutions other than the second price auctions, therefore paving the way for…

Electricity market design that accounts for grid constraints such as voltage and thermal limits at the distribution level can increase opportunities for the grid integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs). In this paper, we consider…

We present a novel approach to the pricing of financial instruments in emission markets, for example, the EU ETS. The proposed structural model is positioned between existing complex full equilibrium models and pure reduced form models.…

We consider a market in which capacity-constrained generators compete in scalar-parameterized supply functions to serve an inelastic demand spread throughout a transmission constrained power network. The market clears according to a…

As the number of prosumers with distributed energy resources (DERs) grows, the conventional centralized operation scheme may suffer from conflicting interests, privacy concerns, and incentive inadequacy. In this paper, we propose an energy…

This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via…