相关论文: Deludedly Agreeing to Agree

This paper investigates the asymptotic behavior of some common opinion dynamic models in a continuum of agents. We show that as long as the interactions among the agents are symmetric, the distribution of the agents' opinion converges. We…

We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class…

We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure. For two agents we introduce a quantitative version of…

We discuss the question of if and how undecidability might be translatable into physics, in particular with respect to prediction and description, as well as to complementarity games.

A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with different opinions, in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed. Various games are considered, which produce different kinds of opinion formation dynamics.…

As a schematic model of the complexity economic agents are confronted with, we introduce the ``SK-game'', a discrete time binary choice model inspired from mean-field spin-glasses. We show that even in a completely static environment,…

We study the stochastic multi-player multi-armed bandit problem. In this problem, $m$ players cooperate to maximize their total reward from $K > m$ arms. However the players cannot communicate and are penalized (e.g. receive no reward) if…

Preference aggregation is a fundamental problem in voting theory, in which public input rankings of a set of alternatives (called preferences) must be aggregated into a single preference that satisfies certain soundness properties. The…

The basic problem in the cooperation theory is to justify the cooperation. Here we propose a new approach, where players are driven by their altruism to cooperate or not. The probability of cooperation depends also on the co-player's…

The theory of repeated games analyzes the long-term relationship of interacting players and mathematically reveals the condition of how cooperation is achieved, which is not achieved in a one-shot game. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma…

An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make a conscious choice between which of these statements will be true. This paper proposes to capture ethical dilemmas as a…

In recent years, agents have become capable of communicating seamlessly via natural language and navigating in environments that involve cooperation and competition, a fact that can introduce social dilemmas. Due to the interleaving of…

Language models are increasingly deployed in interactive online environments, from personal chat assistants to domain-specific agents, raising questions about their cooperative and competitive behavior in multi-party settings. While prior…

Using theory and experiments, this paper shows that the difficulty of making tradeoffs offers a parsimonious explanation for a wide range of behavioral phenomena. We develop a model of imprecise comparisons applicable to multiattribute,…

A significant element of human cooperative intelligence lies in our ability to identify opportunities for fruitful collaboration; and conversely to recognise when the task at hand is better pursued alone. Research on flexible cooperation in…

Explainability algorithms aimed at interpreting decision-making AI systems usually consider balancing two critical dimensions: 1) \textit{faithfulness}, where explanations accurately reflect the model's inference process. 2)…

An agent who interacts with a wide population of other agents needs to be aware that there may be variations in their understanding of the world. Furthermore, the machinery which they use to perceive may be inherently different, as is the…

$S$ equilibrium synthesizes a century of game-theoretic modeling. $S$-beliefs determine choices as in the refinement literature and level-$k$, without anchoring on Nash equilibrium or imposing ad hoc belief formation. $S$-choices allow for…

In this paper, we analyze a Hegselmann-Krause opinion formation model with attractive-lacking interaction. More precisely, we investigate the situation in which the individuals involved in an opinion formation process interact among…

Modern language models fail a fundamental requirement of trustworthy intelligence: knowing when not to answer. Despite achieving impressive accuracy on benchmarks, these models produce confident hallucinations, even when wrong answers carry…