Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs
Theoretical Economics
2020-12-24 v4 Computer Science and Game Theory
Probability
Abstract
We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure. For two agents we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann's Agreement Theorem, and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions due to Dawid et al. (1995). For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a "no-trade" condition. We use these characterizations to study information structures with independent posteriors. We also study persuasion problems with multiple receivers, exploring the extreme feasible distributions.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2002.11362,
title = {Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs},
author = {Itai Arieli and Yakov Babichenko and Fedor Sandomirskiy and Omer Tamuz},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.11362},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
51 pages