相关论文: The axiomatic power of Kolmogorov complexity
The famous G\"odel incompleteness theorem says that for every sufficiently rich formal theory (containing formal arithmetic in some natural sense) there exist true unprovable statements. Such statements would be natural candidates for being…
If no optimal propositional proof system exists, we (and independently Pudl\'ak) prove that ruling out length $t$ proofs of any unprovable sentence is hard. This mapping from unprovable to hard-to-prove sentences powerfully translates facts…
A meta-complexity assumption, Feasible Chaitin Incompleteness (FCI), asserts the hardness of ruling out length $t$ proofs that string $x$ is Kolmogorov random (e.g. $x{\in}R$), by analogy to Chaitin's result that proving $x{\in}R$ is…
Chaitin's incompleteness theorem states that sufficiently rich formal systems cannot prove lower bounds on Kolmogorov complexity. In this paper we extend this theorem by showing theories that prove the Kolmogorov complexity of a large (but…
In this paper we prove Chaitin's ``heuristic principle'', {\it the theorems of a finitely-specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself}, for an appropriate measure of complexity. We show that the measure is…
We consolidate two widely believed conjectures about tautologies -- no optimal proof system exists, and most require superpolynomial size proofs in any system -- into a $p$-isomorphism-invariant condition satisfied by all paddable…
A rather easy yet rigorous proof of a version of G\"odel's first incompleteness theorem is presented. The version is "each recursively enumerable theory of natural numbers with 0, 1, +, *, =, logical and, logical not, and the universal…
In much discussed work Artemov has recently shown that, for $\mathrm{PA}$, the consistency schema admits a form of uniform verification via selector proofs, despite the unprovability of the corresponding uniform consistency sentence…
G\"odel's first and second incompleteness theorems are corner stones of modern mathematics. In this article we present a new proof of these theorems for ZFC and theories containing ZFC, using Chaitin's incompleteness theorem and a very…
Motivated by the problem of finding finite versions of classical incompleteness theorems, we present some conjectures that go beyond ${\bf NP\neq co NP}$. These conjectures formally connect computational complexity with the difficulty of…
In this note we observe that automated theorem provers (ATPs) that recursively enumerate theorems in a particular way will fail to identify some valid theorems for a reason that is analogous to how G\"odel proved the existence of what are…
Hilbert and Ackermann asked for a method to consistently extend incomplete theories to complete theories. G\"odel essentially proved that any theory capable of encoding its own statements and their proofs contains statements that are true…
In 1931, G\"odel presented in K\"onigsberg his famous Incompleteness Theorem, stating that some true mathematical statements are unprovable. Yet, this result gives us no idea about those independent (that is, true and unprovable)…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…
While Kolmogorov complexity is the accepted absolute measure of information content of an individual finite object, a similarly absolute notion is needed for the relation between an individual data sample and an individual model summarizing…
Goedel Incompleteness Theorem leaves open a way around it, vaguely perceived for a long time but not clearly identified. (Thus, Goedel believed informal arguments can answer any math question.) Closing this loophole does not seem obvious…
Turing progressions have been often used to measure the proof-theoretic strength of mathematical theories. Turing progressions based on $n$-provability give rise to a $\Pi_{n+1}$ proof-theoretic ordinal. As such, to each theory $U$ we can…
A formula $\phi$ is called \emph{$n$-provable} in a formal arithmetical theory $S$ if $\phi$ is provable in $S$ together with all true arithmetical $\Pi_{n}$-sentences taken as additional axioms. While in general the set of all $n$-provable…
Given a first-order theory $T$ formulated in the usual language of first-order arithmetic, we say that $T$ is of *restricted complexity* if there is some natural number $n$ and some set $\mathcal A$ of $\Sigma_n$-sentences such that $T$ can…
We give a new proof for Godel's second incompleteness theorem, based on Kolmogorov complexity, Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, and an argument that resembles the surprise examination paradox. We then go the other way around and suggest…