相关论文: No-Regret Learning in Extensive-Form Games with Im…

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to…

Learning and computation of equilibria are central problems in game theory, theory of computation, and artificial intelligence. In this work, we introduce proximal regret, a new notion of regret based on proximal operators that lies…

We present a reduction from reinforcement learning (RL) to no-regret online learning based on the saddle-point formulation of RL, by which "any" online algorithm with sublinear regret can generate policies with provable performance…

In the past decade, motivated by the putative failure of naive self-play deep reinforcement learning (DRL) in adversarial imperfect-information games, researchers have developed numerous DRL algorithms based on fictitious play (FP), double…

We provide the first sub-linear space and sub-linear regret algorithm for online learning with expert advice (against an oblivious adversary), addressing an open question raised recently by Srinivas, Woodruff, Xu and Zhou (STOC 2022). We…

We study algorithms for online linear optimization in Hilbert spaces, focusing on the case where the player is unconstrained. We develop a novel characterization of a large class of minimax algorithms, recovering, and even improving,…

We provide a novel reduction from swap-regret minimization to external-regret minimization, which improves upon the classical reductions of Blum-Mansour [BM07] and Stolz-Lugosi [SL05] in that it does not require finiteness of the space of…

In this paper, we propose Posterior Sampling Reinforcement Learning for Zero-sum Stochastic Games (PSRL-ZSG), the first online learning algorithm that achieves Bayesian regret bound of $O(HS\sqrt{AT})$ in the infinite-horizon zero-sum…

We study risk-sensitive multi-agent reinforcement learning under general-sum Markov games, where agents optimize the entropic risk measure of rewards with possibly diverse risk preferences. We show that using the regret naively adapted from…

We consider a repeated Stackelberg game setup where the leader faces a sequence of followers of unknown types and must learn what commitments to make. While previous works have considered followers that best respond to the commitment…

Recent advances, such as RegretNet, ALGnet, RegretFormer and CITransNet, use deep learning to approximate optimal multi item auctions by relaxing incentive compatibility (IC) and measuring its violation via ex post regret. However, the true…

Online learning algorithms have been successfully used to design caching policies with sublinear regret in the total number of requests, with no statistical assumption about the request sequence. Most existing algorithms involve…

A recent emerging trend in the literature on learning in games has been concerned with providing faster learning dynamics for correlated and coarse correlated equilibria in normal-form games. Much less is known about the significantly more…

Combining machine learning and constrained optimization, Predict+Optimize tackles optimization problems containing parameters that are unknown at the time of solving. Prior works focus on cases with unknowns only in the objectives. A new…

Most existing results about \emph{last-iterate convergence} of learning dynamics are limited to two-player zero-sum games, and only apply under rigid assumptions about what dynamics the players follow. In this paper we provide new results…

The goal of continual learning (CL) is to learn a sequence of tasks without suffering from the phenomenon of catastrophic forgetting. Previous work has shown that leveraging memory in the form of a replay buffer can reduce performance…

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…

We study the problem of no-regret learning algorithms for general monotone and smooth games and their last-iterate convergence properties. Specifically, we investigate the problem under bandit feedback and strongly uncoupled dynamics, which…

The CFR+ algorithm for solving imperfect information games is a variant of the popular CFR algorithm, with faster empirical performance on a range of problems. It was introduced with a theoretical upper bound on solution error, but…

Game theory has grown into a major field over the past few decades, and poker has long served as one of its key case studies. Game-Theory-Optimal (GTO) provides strategies to avoid loss in poker, but pure GTO does not guarantee maximum…