相关论文: Metastability and anomalous fixation in evolutiona…
Using a simple model with link removals as well as link additions, we show that an evolving network is scale free with a degree exponent in the range of (2, 4]. We then establish a relation between the network evolution and a set of…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
We investigate a growing network model that combines preferential and uniform attachment with two distinct mechanisms of edge deletion. In addition to the usual uniform probability edge deletion, we introduce a novel node-based rule in…
We study an evolutionary version of the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where the agents are placed in a random graph. For lattices with fixed connectivity, $\alpha$, we show that for low values of $\alpha$ the final density of cooperating…
In this work we study the behavior of classical two-person, two-strategies evolutionary games on networks embedded in a Euclidean two-dimensional space with different kinds of degree distributions and topologies going from regular to…
We establish a theoretical framework to address evolutionary dynamics of spatial games under strong selection. As the selection intensity tends to infinity, strategy competition unfolds in the deterministic way of winners taking all. We…
In the paper, we present an incremental approach in the construction of scale free networks with hidden variables. The work arises from the necessity to generate that type of networks with a given number of links instead of obtaining a…
We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the probabilities that agents choose suboptimal actions are dependent on payoff consequences. We prove a sample path large deviation principle, characterizing the rate of…
Scale independence is a ubiquitous feature of complex systems which implies a highly skewed distribution of resources with no characteristic scale. Research has long focused on why systems as varied as protein networks, evolution and stock…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game on scale-free networks that are subjected to intentional and random removal of vertices. We show that, irrespective of the game type, cooperation on…
Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with trustworthy actions are crucial to successful and prosperous societies. The Trust Game has been widely used to quantitatively study trust and trustworthiness, involving a sequential…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
The theory of complex networks and of disordered systems is used to study the stability and dynamical properties of a simple model of material flow networks defined on random graphs. In particular we address instabilities that are…
In evolutionary game theory, repeated two-player games are used to study strategy evolution in a population under natural selection. As the evolution greatly depends on the interaction structure, there has been growing interests in studying…
Population structure can be modelled by evolutionary graphs, which can have a substantial, but very subtle influence on the fate of the arising mutants. Individuals are located on the nodes of these graphs, competing with each other to…
Methods connecting dynamical systems and graph theory have attracted increasing interest in the past few years, with applications ranging from a detailed comparison of different kinds of dynamics to the characterisation of empirical data.…
Activity or spin patterns on random scale-free network are studied by mean field analysis and computer simulations. These activity patterns evolve in time according to local majority-rule dynamics which is implemented using (i) parallel or…
We study large fluctuations in evolutionary games belonging to the coordination and anti-coordination classes. The dynamics of these games, modeling cooperation dilemmas, is characterized by a coexistence fixed point separating two…
We study the evolution of a random weighted network with complex nonlinear dynamics at each node, whose activity may cease as a result of interactions with other nodes. Starting from a knowledge of the micro-level behaviour at each node, we…
The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…