相关论文: Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matc…

We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the…

We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable parameter of the model and study a broad class of functions…

This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding language to truthfully express their…

We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…

Tandem queueing systems are widely-used stochastic models that arise from many real-life service operations systems. Motivated by the desire to understand the trade-off between the performance and complexity of policies for…

Sponsored search is an important monetization channel for search engines, in which an auction mechanism is used to select the ads shown to users and determine the prices charged from advertisers. There have been several pieces of work in…

A canonical setting for non-monetary online resource allocation is one where agents compete over multiple rounds for a single item per round, with i.i.d. valuations and additive utilities across rounds. With $n$ symmetric agents, a natural…

In this work, we aim to design a data marketplace; a robust real-time matching mechanism to efficiently buy and sell training data for Machine Learning tasks. While the monetization of data and pre-trained models is an essential focus of…

Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do not take into account the fact that the power…

We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the agent who receives it, while inducing truthfulness using…

It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…

Traditional combinatorial spectrum auctions mainly rely on fixed bidding and matching processes, which limit participants' ability to adapt their strategies and often result in suboptimal social welfare in dynamic spectrum sharing…

Game-theoretic models relevant for computer science applications usually feature a large number of players. The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for bounding the price of anarchy in such models. We demonstrate the…

We analyze the optimal information design in a click-through auction with fixed valuations per click, but stochastic click-through rates. While the auctioneer takes as given the auction rule of the click-through auction, namely the…

We study a continuous-time, infinite-horizon dynamic bipartite matching problem. Suppliers arrive according to a Poisson process; while waiting, they may abandon the queue at a uniform rate. Customers on the other hand must be matched upon…

This research proposes a novel auction mechanism for transactive energy exchange between buyers and sellers, modeled as agents in a microgrid. The mechanism is implemented by a separate microgrid controller (MC) agent, and requires big data…

It is well recognised that ensuring fair AI systems is a complex sociotechnical challenge, which requires careful deliberation and continuous oversight across all stages of a system's lifecycle, from defining requirements to model…

Small operators who take part in secondary wireless spectrum markets typically have strict budget limits. In this paper, we study the bidding problem of a budget constrained operator in repeated secondary spectrum auctions. In existing…

In contextual dynamic pricing, a seller sequentially prices goods based on contextual information. Buyers will purchase products only if the prices are below their valuations. The goal of the seller is to design a pricing strategy that…

We study a market for private data in which a data analyst publicly releases a statistic over a database of private information. Individuals that own the data incur a cost for their loss of privacy proportional to the differential privacy…