相关论文: Lattice games without rational strategies
Game Logic is an excellent setting to study proofs-about-programs via the interpretation of those proofs as programs, because constructive proofs for games correspond to effective winning strategies to follow in response to the opponent's…
We analyze Coquand's game-theoretic interpretation of Peano Arithmetic through the lens of elementary descent recursion. In Coquand's game semantics, winning strategies correspond to infinitary cut-free proofs and cut elimination…
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its…
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its…
We show the equivalence between the existence of winning strategies for $G_{\delta \sigma}$ (also called $\Sigma^{0}_{3}$) games in Cantor or Baire space, and the existence of functions generalized-recursive in a higher type-2 functional.…
In this paper we consider positional games where the winning sets are tree universal graphs. Specifically, we show that in the unbiased Maker-Breaker game on the complete graph $K_n$, Maker has a strategy to occupy a graph which contains…
We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of…
We characterize common assumption of rationality of 2-person games within an incomplete information framework. We use the lexicographic model with incomplete information and show that a belief hierarchy expresses common assumption of…
We examine the class of spaces in which the second player has a winning strategy in the open--open game. We show that this spaces are not universally Kuratowski-Ulam. We also show that the games G and G7 introduced by P. Daniels, K. Kunen,…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
For an ascending correspondence $F:X\to 2^X$ with chain-complete values on a complete lattice $X$, we prove that the set of fixed points is a complete lattice. This strengthens Zhou's fixed point theorem. For chain-complete posets that are…
We define a general framework of partition games for formulating two-player pebble games over finite structures. We show that one particular such game, which we call the invertible-map game, yields a family of polynomial-time approximations…
Justification theory is a unifying semantic framework. While it has its roots in non-monotonic logics, it can be applied to various areas in computer science, especially in explainable reasoning; its most central concept is a justification:…
Solving a problem of Diestel and Pott, we construct a large class of infinite matroids. These can be used to provide counterexamples against the natural extension of the Well-quasi-ordering-Conjecture to infinite matroids and to show that…
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We…
Given a morphism from an affine semigroup Q to an arbitrary commutative monoid, it is shown that every fiber possesses an affine stratification: a partition into a finite disjoint union of translates of normal affine semigroups. The proof…
Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability…
We introduce quantitative reductions, a novel technique for structuring the space of quantitative games and solving them that does not rely on a reduction to qualitative games. We show that such reductions exhibit the same desirable…
The rationalizability concept was introduced in \cite{Ber84} and \cite{Pea84} to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However, this notion can be defined in a number…