相关论文: Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching

We study algorithms in the distributed message-passing model that produce secured output, for an input graph $G$. Specifically, each vertex computes its part in the output, the entire output is correct, but each vertex cannot discover the…

Constrained maximization of submodular functions poses a central problem in combinatorial optimization. In many realistic scenarios, a number of agents need to maximize multiple submodular objectives over the same ground set. We study such…

In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…

State space subspace algorithms for input-output systems have been widely applied but also have a reasonably well-developedasymptotic theory dealing with consistency. However, guaranteeing the stability of the estimated system matrix is a…

We initiate the study of deep learning for the automated design of two-sided matching mechanisms. What is of most interest is to use machine learning to understand the possibility of new tradeoffs between strategy-proofness and stability.…

We focus on the problem of placing two facilities along a linear space to serve a group of agents. Each agent is committed to minimizing the distance between her location and the closest facility. A mechanism is an algorithm that maps the…

We introduce the notion of Local Computation Mechanism Design - designing game theoretic mechanisms which run in polylogarithmic time and space. Local computation mechanisms reply to each query in polylogarithmic time and space, and the…

Following the work of Anily et al., we consider a variant of bin packing, called "bin packing with general cost structures" (GCBP) and design an asymptotic fully polynomial time approximation scheme (AFPTAS) for this problem. In the classic…

This paper studies the design of mechanisms that are robust to misspecification. We introduce a novel notion of robustness that connects a variety of disparate approaches and study its implications in a wide class of mechanism design…

We initiate a systematic study of utilizing predictions to improve over approximation guarantees of classic algorithms, without increasing the running time. We propose a systematic method for a wide class of optimization problems that ask…

The theory of optimal choice sets offers a well-established solution framework in social choice and game theory. In social choice theory, decision-making is typically modeled as a maximization problem. However, when preferences are cyclic…

The Matroid Secretary Problem (MSP) is one of the most prominent settings for online resource allocation and optimal stopping. A decision-maker is presented with a ground set of elements $E$ revealed sequentially and in random order. Upon…

We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the…

We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing. Imagine that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a mechanism in this setting consists of an assignment, determining…

Designing efficient car parking mechanisms that can be potentially integrated into future intelligent transportation systems is of crucial importance. Usually, the related design problems are combinatorial and the worst-case complexity of…

The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…

We consider a far generalization of the well-known stable roommates and non-bipartite stable allocation problems. In its setting, one is given a finite non-bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ with nonnegative integer edge capacities $b(e)\in{\mathbb…

In this paper, we propose a robust optimization-based heuristic algorithm for the chance-constrained binary knapsack problem (CKP). We assume that the weights of items are independent normally distributed. By utilizing the properties of the…

Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on…

We study bandit learning in matching markets with two-sided reward uncertainty, extending prior research primarily focused on single-sided uncertainty. Leveraging the concept of `super-stability' from Irving (1994), we demonstrate the…