相关论文: Benchmark Problems for Totally Unimodular Set Syst…

Double sided auctions are widely used in financial markets to match demand and supply. Prior works on double sided auctions have focused primarily on single quantity trade requests. We extend various notions of double sided auctions to…

In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids…

Double auctions are widely used in financial markets, such as those for stocks, derivatives, currencies, and commodities, to match demand and supply. Once all buyers and sellers have placed their trade requests, the exchange determines how…

We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit-maximizing auction design literature as it requires no…

The issue of fairness in AI arises from discriminatory practices in applications like job recommendations and risk assessments, emphasising the need for algorithms that do not discriminate based on group characteristics. This concern is…

Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study…

We consider a package assignment problem with multiple units of indivisible items. The seller can specify preferences over partitions of their supply between buyers as packaging costs. We propose incremental costs together with a graph that…

We study the $k$-Submodular Cover ($kSC$) problem, a natural generalization of the classical Submodular Cover problem that arises in artificial intelligence and combinatorial optimization tasks such as influence maximization, resource…

This paper studies one emerging procurement auction scenario where the market is constructed over the social networks. In a social network composed of many agents, smartphones or computers, one requester releases her requirement for goods…

A standing assumption in the literature on proportional transaction costs is efficient friction. Together with robust no free lunch with vanishing risk, it rules out strategies of infinite variation, as they usually appear in frictionless…

We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is "approximately" optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is…

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two major classes of valuations, namely…

The auction theory literature has so far focused mostly on the design of mechanisms that takes the revenue or the efficiency as a yardstick. However, scenarios where the {\it capacity}, which we define as \textit{``the number of bidders the…

Package-to-group recommender systems recommend a set of unified items to a group of people. Different from conventional settings, it is not easy to measure the utility of group recommendations because it involves more than one user. In…

Auction-based recommender systems are prevalent in online advertising platforms, but they are typically optimized to allocate recommendation slots based on immediate expected return metrics, neglecting the downstream effects of…

Balancing fairness and efficiency in resource allocation is a classical economic and computational problem. The price of fairness measures the worst-case loss of economic efficiency when using an inefficient but fair allocation rule; for…

Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. Theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits in the past decades and analytical solutions are known for only a…

This paper unifies two foundational constructs from economics and algorithmic game theory, the Arctic Auction and the linear Fisher market, to address the efficient allocation of differentiated goods in complex markets. Our main…

Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…

Budget-management systems are one of the key components of modern auction markets. Internet advertising platforms typically offer advertisers the possibility to pace the rate at which their budget is depleted, through budget-pacing…