相关论文: Application of the EWL protocol to decision proble…

The field of Game Theory provides a useful mechanism for modeling many decision-making scenarios. In participating in these scenarios individuals and groups adopt particular strategies, which generally perform with varying levels of…

We introduce an extension of Strategy Logic for the imperfect-information setting, called SLii, and study its model-checking problem. As this logic naturally captures multi-player games with imperfect information, this problem is…

Large language models (LLMs) are effective at answering questions that are clearly asked. However, when faced with ambiguous queries they can act unpredictably and produce incorrect outputs. This underscores the need for the development of…

We apply a Bayesian agent-based framework inspired by QBism to iterations of two quantum games, the CHSH game and the quantum prisoners' dilemma. In each two-player game, players hold beliefs about an amount of shared entanglement and about…

In game theory and artificial intelligence, decision making models often involve maximizing expected utility, which does not respect ordinal invariance. In this paper, the author discusses the possibility of preserving ordinal invariance…

We consider two-player games with imperfect information and the synthesis of a randomized strategy for one player that ensures the objective is satisfied almost-surely (i.e., with probability 1), regardless of the strategy of the other…

We characterize all common notions of behavioral equivalence by one 6-dimensional energy game, where energies bound capabilities of an attacker trying to tell processes apart. The defender-winning initial credits exhaustively determine…

We introduce an extension of Strategy Logic for the imperfect-information setting, called SLii, and study its model-checking problem. As this logic naturally captures multi-player games with imperfect information, the problem turns out to…

The two-players $N$ strategies games quantized according to the Eisert-Lewenstein-Wilkens scheme (Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 (1999), 3077) are considered. Group theoretical methods are applied to the problem of finding a general form of gate…

Strategic uncertainty complicates policy design in coordination games. To rein in strategic uncertainty, the Planner in this paper connects the problem of policy design to that of equilibrium selection. We characterize the subsidy scheme…

Sequential decision-making refers to algorithms that take into account the dynamics of the environment, where early decisions affect subsequent decisions. With large language models (LLMs) demonstrating powerful capabilities between tasks,…

Iterated bipartite quantum games are implemented in terms of the discrete-time quantum walk on the line. Our proposal allows for conditional strategies, as two rational agents make a choice from a restricted set of two-qubit unitary…

Regular games form a well-established class of games for analysis and synthesis of reactive systems. They include coloured Muller games, McNaughton games, Muller games, Rabin games, and Streett games. These games are played on directed…

The policy iteration method is a classical algorithm for solving optimal control problems. In this paper, we introduce a policy iteration method for Mean Field Games systems, and we study the convergence of this procedure to a solution of…

We study the problem of guaranteeing low regret in repeated games against an opponent with unknown membership in one of several classes. We add the constraint that our algorithm is non-exploitable, in that the opponent lacks an incentive to…

We study single-player extensive-form games with imperfect recall, such as the Sleeping Beauty problem or the Absentminded Driver game. For such games, two natural equilibrium concepts have been proposed as alternative solution concepts to…

At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…

In this paper, we investigate the probabilistic variants of the strategy logics ATL and ATL* under imperfect information. Specifically, we present novel decidability and complexity results when the model transitions are stochastic and…

Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…

We study a generalisation of B\"uchi-Landweber games to the timed setting. The winning condition is specified by a non-deterministic timed automaton, and one of the players can elapse time. We perform a systematic study of synthesis…