相关论文: Truthfulness via Proxies
Truthfulness is fragile and demanding. It is oftentimes computationally harder than solving the original problem. Even worse, truthfulness can be utterly destroyed by small uncertainties in a mechanism's outcome. One obstacle is that…
We propose a novel proof technique that can be applied to attack a broad class of problems in computational complexity, when switching the order of universal and existential quantifiers is helpful. Our approach combines the standard min-max…
We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing…
We study online auction settings in which agents arrive and depart dynamically in a random (secretary) order, and each agent's private type consists of the agent's arrival and departure times, value and budget. We consider multi-unit…
We present an incentive-compatible polynomial-time approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions with general k-minded player valuations. The mechanism fully optimizes over an appropriately chosen sub-range of possible allocations and then…
Reachability Logic is a formalism that can be used, among others, for expressing partial-correctness properties of transition systems. In this paper we present three proof systems for this formalism, all of which are sound and complete and…
With help of a compact Prolog-based theorem prover for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic, we synthesize minimal assumptions under which a given formula formula becomes a theorem. After applying our synthesis algorithm to cover basic…
In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in designing truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the allocation rule once. We present a general…
$\newcommand{\eps}{\varepsilon}$We present an auction algorithm using multiplicative instead of constant weight updates to compute a $(1-\eps)$-approximate maximum weight matching (MWM) in a bipartite graph with $n$ vertices and $m$ edges…
We study combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations. In such settings, each agent $i$ has a private signal $s_i$ that captures her private information, and the valuation function of every agent depends on the entire signal…
Auction data often contain information on only the most competitive bids as opposed to all bids. The usual measurement error approaches to unobserved heterogeneity are inapplicable due to dependence among order statistics. We bridge this…
A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attempt to incorporate these findings into the theory of…
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…
The language of probability is used to define several different types of conditional statements. There are four principal types: subjunctive, material, existential, and feasibility. Two further types of conditionals are defined using the…
We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in…
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format used in recent European spectrum auctions. We show that an auction-specific version of truthful bidding leads to an efficient allocation. We then characterize…
A $\lambda$-calculus is introduced in which all programs can be evaluated in probabilistic polynomial time and in which there is sufficient structure to represent sequential cryptographic constructions and adversaries for them, even when…
This paper studies inference in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with many bidders, using an asymptotic framework where the number of bidders increases while the number of auctions remains fixed. Our approach enables…
Using mechanised reasoning we prove that combinatorial Vickrey auctions are soundly specified in that they associate a unique outcome (allocation and transfers) to any valid input (bids). Having done so, we auto-generate verified executable…
Given a set of $m$ agents and a set of $n$ items, where agent $A$ has utility $u_{A,i}$ for item $i$, our goal is to allocate items to agents to maximize fairness. Specifically, the utility of an agent is the sum of its utilities for items…