相关论文: Fictitious Play with Time-Invariant Frequency Upda…

Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive and…

Feint actions refer to a set of deceptive actions, which enable players to obtain temporal advantages from their opponents. Such actions are regarded as widely-used tactic in most non-deterministic Two-player Games (e.g. boxing and…

We study the asymptotic value of a frequency-dependent zero-sum game with separable payoff following a differential approach. The stage payoffs in such games depend on the current actions and on a linear function of the frequency of actions…

Mean-payoff games on timed automata are played on the infinite weighted graph of configurations of priced timed automata between two players, Player Min and Player Max, by moving a token along the states of the graph to form an infinite…

We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…

We study a wireless jamming problem consisting of the competition between a legitimate receiver and a jammer, as a zero-sum game where the value to maximize/minimize is the channel capacity at the receiver's side. Most of the approaches…

Fictitious play is a simple and widely studied adaptive heuristic for playing repeated games. It is well known that fictitious play fails to be Hannan consistent. Several variants of fictitious play including regret matching, generalized…

We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…

We study a class of two-player competitive concurrent stochastic games on graphs with reachability objectives. Specifically, player 1 aims to reach a subset $F_1$ of game states, and player 2 aims to reach a subset $F_2$ of game states…

The dynamics of minority games with agents trading on different time scales is studied via dynamical mean-field theory. We analyze the case where the agents' decision-making process is deterministic and its stochastic generalization with…

A rise in Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) has introduced a need for robustness against long-running, stealthy attacks which circumvent existing cryptographic security guarantees. FlipIt is a security game that models attacker-defender…

We consider eager-push epidemic dissemination in a complete graph. Time is divided into synchronous stages. In each stage, a source disseminates $\nu$ events. Each event is sent by the source, and forwarded by each node upon its first…

Ensuring robust safety alignment is crucial for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet existing defenses often lag behind evolving adversarial attacks due to their \textbf{reliance on static, pre-collected data distributions}. In this paper, we…

This paper studies a variant of multi-player reach-avoid game played between intruders and defenders. The intruder team tries to score by sending as many intruders as possible to the target area, while the defender team tries to minimize…

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and game theory, agents repeatedly interact and revise their strategies as new data arrives, producing a sequence of strategy profiles. This paper studies sequences of strategies satisfying a…

In a recent work, Moshkovitz [FOCS '14] presented a transformation on two-player games called "fortification", and gave an elementary proof of an (exponential decay) parallel repetition theorem for fortified two-player projection games. In…

Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study…

We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…

Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a…

We construct a diffusion approximation of a repeated game in which agents make bets on outcomes of i.i.d. random vectors and their strategies are close to an asymptotically optimal strategy. This model can be interpreted as trading in an…