相关论文: A VLSI Design Flow for Secure Side-Channel Attack …

Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and…

Systems based on deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Unrestricted adversarial attacks typically manipulate the semantic content of an image (e.g., color or texture) to create adversarial examples that are both…

This paper studies the problem of reasoning about flow security properties in virtualised computing networks with mobility from perspective of formal language. We propose a distributed process algebra CSP_{4v} with security labelled…

Timing side-channel attacks pose a major threat to embedded systems due to their ease of accessibility. We propose CIDPro, a framework that relies on dynamic program diversification to mitigate timing side-channel leakage. The proposed…

The rise of cyber-security concerns has brought significant attention to the analysis and design of cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Among the various types of cyberattacks, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and false data injection (FDI)…

Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge,i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls.…

Computing systems, including real-time embedded systems, are becoming increasingly connected to allow for more advanced and safer operation. Such embedded systems are resource-constrained, such as lower processing capabilities, as compared…

To protect cryptographic implementations from side-channel vulnerabilities, developers must adopt constant-time programming practices. As these can be error-prone, many side-channel detection tools have been proposed. Despite this, such…

Microarchitectural timing side channels have been thoroughly investigated as a security threat in hardware designs featuring shared buffers (e.g., caches) or parallelism between attacker and victim task execution. However, contradicting…

We propose a novel approach for performing side-channel attacks on elliptic curve cryptography. Unlike previous approaches and inspired by the ``activity detection'' literature, we adopt a long-short-term memory (LSTM) neural network to…

In order to protect the security of network data, a high speed chip module for encrypting and decrypting of network data packet is designed. The chip module is oriented for internet information security SOC (System on Chip) design. During…

This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…

Threats associated with the untrusted fabrication of integrated circuits (ICs) are numerous: piracy, overproduction, reverse engineering, hardware trojans, etc. The use of reconfigurable elements (i.e., look-up tables as in FPGAs) is a…

A long-standing challenge is the design of chips resilient to faults and glitches. Both fine-grained gate diversity and coarse-grained modular redundancy have been used in the past. However, these approaches have not been well-studied under…

Security vulnerability analysis of Integrated Circuits using conventional design-time validation and verification techniques (like simulations, emulations, etc.) is generally a computationally intensive task and incomplete by nature,…

Acoustic side-channel attacks on keyboards can bypass security measures in many systems that use keyboards as one of the input devices. These attacks aim to reveal users' sensitive information by targeting the sounds made by their keyboards…

In recent years a new class of side-channel attacks has emerged. Instead of targeting device emissions during dynamic computation, adversaries now frequently exploit the leakage or response behaviour of integrated circuits in a static…

Secret keys can be extracted from the power consumption or electromagnetic emanations of unprotected devices. Traditional counter-measures have limited scope of protection, and impose several restrictions on how sensitive data must be…

Power side-channel attacks exploit the dynamic power consumption of cryptographic operations to leak sensitive information of encryption hardware. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct power side-channel analysis for assessing the…

Recent Pwn2Own competitions have demonstrated the continued effectiveness of control hijacking attacks despite deployed countermeasures including stack canaries and ASLR. A powerful defense called Control flow Integrity (CFI) offers a…