相关论文: A VLSI Design Flow for Secure Side-Channel Attack …
Self-Supervised Learning (SSL) has emerged as a significant paradigm in representation learning thanks to its ability to learn without extensive labeled data, its strong generalization capabilities, and its potential for privacy…
Hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of academia, industry and government agencies. Effective detection mechanisms and countermeasures against such malicious designs can only be developed when there is a deep understanding of how…
This work presents a Cross-device Deep-Learning based Electromagnetic (EM-X-DL) side-channel analysis (SCA), achieving >90% single-trace attack accuracy on AES-128, even in the presence of significantly lower signal-to-noise ratio (SNR),…
Side-channel attacks on microprocessors, like the RISC-V, exhibit security vulnerabilities that lead to several design challenges. Hence, it is imperative to study and analyze these security vulnerabilities comprehensively. In this paper,…
The power consumption of a microprocessor is a huge channel for information leakage. While the most popular exploitation of this channel is to recover cryptographic keys from embedded devices, other applications such as mobile app…
Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption. Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a major threat…
The arm race between hardware security engineers and side-channel researchers has become more competitive with more sophisticated attacks and defenses in the last decade. While modern hardware features improve the system performance…
Various side-channel attacks (SCAs) on ICs have been successfully demonstrated and also mitigated to some degree. In the context of 3D ICs, however, prior art has mainly focused on efficient implementations of classical SCA countermeasures.…
Despite its ever-increasing impact, security is not considered as a design objective in commercial electronic design automation (EDA) tools. This results in vulnerabilities being overlooked during the software-hardware design process.…
Speculative execution attacks undermine the security of constant-time programming, the standard technique used to prevent microarchitectural side channels in security-sensitive software such as cryptographic code. Constant-time code must…
Software weaknesses that create attack surfaces for adversarial exploits, such as lateral SQL injection (LSQLi) attacks, are usually introduced during the design phase of software development. Security design patterns are sometimes applied…
Due to the constant increase and versatility of IoT devices that should keep sensitive information private, Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks on embedded devices are gaining visibility in the industrial field. The integration and…
As cache-based side-channel attacks become serious security problems, various defenses have been proposed and deployed in both software and hardware. Consequently, cache-based side-channel attacks on processes co-residing on the same core…
Recent work on Side Channel Analysis (SCA) targets old, well-known vulnerabilities, even previously exploited, reported, and patched in high-profile cryptography libraries. Nevertheless, researchers continue to find and exploit the same…
Side channel attacks (SCAs) remain a significant threat to the security of cryptographic systems in modern embedded devices. Even mathematically secure cryptographic algorithms, when implemented in hardware, inadvertently leak information…
Power side-channel analysis (SCA) has been of immense interest to most embedded designers to evaluate the physical security of the system. This work presents profiling-based cross-device power SCA attacks using deep learning techniques on…
In this paper, we assess the security and testability of the state-of-the-art design-for-security (DFS) architectures in the presence of scan-chain locking/obfuscation, a group of solution that has previously proposed to restrict…
Side channel attacks are a major security concern for smart cards and other embedded devices. They analyze the variations on the power consumption to find the secret key of the encryption algorithm implemented within the security IC. To…
The dependence of power-consumption on the processed data is a known vulnerability of CMOS circuits, resulting in side channels which can be exploited by power-based side channel attacks (SCAs). These attacks can extract sensitive…
Control-flow leakage (CFL) attacks enable an attacker to expose control-flow decisions of a victim program via side-channel observations. Linearization (i.e., elimination) of secret-dependent control flow is the main countermeasure against…