相关论文: Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient …

We study linear quadratic dynamic games where players are uncertain about each other's control policies or goals and consequently seek to be strategically robust. Building on recent work on strategically robust and risk-averse game theory,…

For a constant $\epsilon$, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in two-player NxN games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the…

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…

We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers…

Iterated coopetitive games capture the situation when one must efficiently balance between cooperation and competition with the other agents over time in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility).…

An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect…

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

In decision-dependent games, multiple players optimize their decisions under a data distribution that shifts with their joint actions, creating complex dynamics in applications like market pricing. A practical consequence of these dynamics…

Broadcast protocols enable a set of $n$ parties to agree on the input of a designated sender, even facing attacks by malicious parties. In the honest-majority setting, randomization and cryptography were harnessed to achieve…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

We show that in any $n$-player $m$-action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse…

In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…

In a multiparty message-passing model of communication, there are $k$ players. Each player has a private input, and they communicate by sending messages to one another over private channels. While this model has been used extensively in…

We provide a syntactic construction of correlated equilibrium. For any finite game, we study how players coordinate their play on a signal by means of a public strategy whose instructions are expressed in some natural language. Language can…

We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…

In several game situations, the behavior of the players may depend not only on individual interests, but also on what each player considers as the correct thing to do. This work presents a game theoretic model, aiming to describe game…

In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are…

We study the design of resilient and reliable communication networks in which a signal can be transferred only up to a limited distance before its quality falls below an acceptable threshold. When excessive signal degradation occurs,…

Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…