相关论文: Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient …

Abraham, Dolev, Geffner, and Halpern proved that, in asynchronous systems, a $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium for $n$ players and a trusted mediator can be implemented without the mediator as long as $n > 4(k+t)$, where an equilibrium is…

A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may otherwise not be possible. We study the ability of players to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediator, using only cheap talk, that is, nonbinding pre-play…

For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are…

We consider $k$-resilient sequential equilibria, strategy profiles where no player in a coalition of at most $k$ players believes that it can increase its utility by deviating, regardless of its local state. We prove that all $k$-resilient…

We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…

A mediator is a mechanism that can only suggest actions to players, as a function of all agents' reported types, in a given game of incomplete information. We study what is achievable by two kinds of mediators, "strong" and "weak." Players…

In an information aggregation game, a set of senders interact with a receiver through a mediator. Each sender observes the state of the world and communicates a message to the mediator, who recommends an action to the receiver based on the…

We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distinct nodes in a communication network. Communication between the sender and the receiver is thus indirect. We ask when it is possible to robustly implement the…

This paper investigates the implementation and performance of a decentralized information transmission mechanism in game with complete or incomplete games. We propose a mechanism that realizes irrational correlated equilibria or irrational…

It is well known that a non-cooperative game may have multiple equilibria. In this paper we consider the efficiency of games, measured by the ratio between the aggregate payoff over all Nash equilibria and that over all admissible controls.…

In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…

We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of $n \geq 2$ identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of $k \geq…

In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how much can the players benefit from having a trusted mediator compared with the standard…

We study the bounds of mediated communication in sender-receiver games in which the sender's payoff is state-independent. We show that the feasible distributions over the receiver's beliefs under mediation are those that induce zero…

There is currently an intersection in the research of game theory and cryptography. Generally speaking, there are two aspects to this partnership. First there is the application of game theory to cryptography. Yet, the purpose of this paper…

A notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that…

It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…

In a $k$-party communication problem, the $k$ players with inputs $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_k$, respectively, want to evaluate a function $f(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_k)$ using as little communication as possible. We consider the message-passing…

We consider the problem of decentralized power allocation for competitive rate-maximization in a frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel under bounded channel uncertainty. We formulate a distribution-free robust framework for the…