理论经济学
We study the classic house-swapping problem of Shapley and Scarf (1974) in a setting where agents may have "objective" indifferences, i.e., indifferences that are shared by all agents. In other words, if any one agent is indifferent between…
Kin selection and direct reciprocity are two most basic mechanisms for promoting cooperation in human society. Generalizing the standard models of the multi-player Prisoner's Dilemma and the Public Goods games for heterogeneous populations,…
Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy non-imposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by…
We derive robust predictions in games involving flexible information acquisition, also known as rational inattention (Sims 2003). These predictions remain accurate regardless of the specific methods players employ to gather information.…
We study reserve prices in auctions with independent private values when bidders are expectations-based loss averse. We find that the optimal public reserve price excludes fewer bidder types than under risk neutrality. Moreover, we show…
We study the strategic advantages of coarsening one's utility by clustering nearby payoffs together (i.e., classifying them the same way). Our solution concept, coarse-utility equilibrium (CUE) requires that (1) each player maximizes her…
The development of energy systems is not a technocratic process but equally shaped by societal and cultural forces. Key instruments in this process are model-based scenarios describing a future energy system. Applying the concept of…
For centuries, it has been widely believed that the influence of a small coalition of voters is negligible in a large election. Consequently, there is a large body of literature on characterizing the likelihood for an election to be…
Liquid democracy is a system that combines aspects of direct democracy and representative democracy by allowing voters to either vote directly themselves, or delegate their votes to others. In this paper we study the information aggregation…
An agent's preferences depend on an ordered parameter or type. We characterize the set of utility functions with single-crossing differences (SCD) in convex environments. These include preferences over lotteries, both in expected utility…
In this paper we study the aggregation of fuzzy preferences on non-necessarily finite societies. We characterize in terms of possibility and impossibility a family of models of complete preferences in which the transitivity is defined for…
This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially shareable along social links. We introduce a model in which each individual in a social network not only decides how much of a shareable good to provide, but also decides…
This paper proposes a spatial model with a realistic geography where a continuous distribution of agents (e.g., farmers) engages in economic interactions with one location from a finite set (e.g., cities). The spatial structure of the…
When inferring the causal effect of one variable on another from correlational data, a common practice by professional researchers as well as lay decision makers is to control for some set of exogenous confounding variables. Choosing an…
We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility in finite games. We show that iterated admissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of "cautious rationality and…
These lecture notes accompany a one-semester graduate course on information and learning in economic theory. Topics include common knowledge, Bayesian updating, monotone-likelihood ratio properties, affiliation, the Blackwell order, cost of…
Barseghyan and Molinari (2023) give sufficient conditions for semi-nonparametric point identification of parameters of interest in a mixture model of decision-making under risk, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in utility functions and…
Attempts at predatory capture may provoke a defensive response that reduces the very value of the predated resource. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of simultaneous-move, two-player Attacker-Defender games that model such interactions.…
This study examines the mechanism design problem for public goods provision in a large economy with $n$ independent agents. We propose a class of dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanisms, which we…
We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it satisfies the measurability condition…