理论经济学
This paper resolves Aaron's social insurance paradox, which suggests that introducing a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system increases welfare when population growth plus average wage growth exceeds interest rates. Using a simplified…
Electric power systems are undergoing a major transformation as they integrate intermittent renewable energy sources, and batteries to smooth out variations in renewable energy production. As privately-owned batteries grow from their role…
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…
In this note, we propose an alternative definition of strategies and histories in opportunity hunting games, as introduced in Eilat, Neeman and Solan (2025). The advantage of the formulation presented here is that it encompasses a broader…
In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning…
We consider linear orders of finite alternatives constructed by aggregating individual preferences. Specifically, we focus on linear orders that respect modified collective preference relations derived from supermajority rules, where…
The purpose of this paper is to provide a micro-economic foundation for an argument that the direct employment by the government is more desirable than the government purchase of private goods to eliminate unemployment. A general…
In many service markets, expert providers possess an information advantage over consumers regarding the necessary services, creating opportunities for fraudulent practices. These may involve overtreatment through unnecessary services or…
A multiproduct seller is more informed than consumers about the value of her products to consumers. The seller posts a price list and segments the market through cheap-talk communication. We find that when both seller's and consumers'…
We develop a novel framework for costly information acquisition in which a decision-maker learns about an unobserved state by choosing a signal distribution, with the cost of information determined by the distribution of noise in the…
We study information disclosure policies for contests among groups. Each player endogenously decides whether or not to participate in competition as a member of their group. Within-group aggregation of effort is best-shot, i.e., each…
This study extends Blackwell's (1953) comparison of information to a sequential social learning model, where agents make decisions sequentially based on both private signals and the observed actions of others. In this context, we introduce…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
An information broker incentivizes consumers to share their information, while designing an information structure to shape the market segmentation. The information broker is a metaphor for an Internet platform that matches consumers with…
Sequential equilibrium requires a consistent assessment and sequential rationality, where the consistent assessment emerges from a convergent sequence of totally mixed behavioral strategies and associated beliefs. However, the original…
We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates…
We consider finite $n$-person deterministic graphical games and study the existence of pure stationary Nash-equilibrium in such games. We assume that all infinite plays are equivalent and form a unique outcome, while each terminal position…
Urban forests provide ecosystem services that are public goods with local (shade) to global (carbon sequestration) benefits and occur on both public and private lands. Thus, incentives for private tree owners to invest in tree care may fall…
We study a dynamic contracting problem with multiple agents and limited commitment. A principal seeks to screen efficient agents using one-period contracts, but is tempted to revise contract terms upon knowing an agent's type. Alterations…
We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in various settings, including science funding, allocation of…