理论经济学

In various situations, decision makers face experts that may provide conflicting advice. This advice may be in the form of probabilistic forecasts over critical future events. We consider a setting where the two forecasters provide their…

We introduce and study the property of orthogonal independence, a restricted additivity axiom applying when alternatives are orthogonal. The axiom requires that the preference for one marginal change over another should be maintained after…

We consider the model of economic growth with time delayed investment function. Assuming the investment is time distributed we can use the linear chain trick technique to transform delay differential equation system to equivalent system of…

On taking a non-trivial and semi-transitive bi-relation constituted by two (hard and soft) binary relations, we report a (i) p-continuity assumption that guarantees the completeness and transitivity of its soft part, and a (ii)…

A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…

We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a production economy with infinitely many commodities and a measure space of agents whose preferences are price dependent. We employ a saturated measure space for the set of agents and…

Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure…

Always, if the number of states is equal to two; or if the number of receiver actions is equal to two and i. The number of states is three or fewer, or ii. The game is cheap talk, or ii. There are just two available messages for the sender.…

Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong…

We examine problems of ``intermediated implementation,'' in which a single principal can only regulate limited aspects of the consumption bundles traded between intermediaries and agents with hidden characteristics. An example is sales, in…

We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…

We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the…

This paper studies whether a planner who only has information about the network topology can discriminate among agents according to their network position. The planner proposes a simple menu of contracts, one for each location, in order to…

This paper explores the gain maximization problem of two nations engaging in non-cooperative bilateral trade. Probabilistic model of an exchange of commodities under different price systems is considered. Volume of commodities exchanged…

An important question in economics is how people choose between different payments in the future. The classical normative model predicts that a decision maker discounts a later payment relative to an earlier one by an exponential function…

This paper uses an axiomatic foundation to create a new measure for the cost of learning that allows for multiple perceptual distances in a single choice environment so that some events can be harder to differentiate between than others.…

Paul A. Samuelson's (1966) capitulation during the so-called Cambridge controversy on the re-switching of techniques in capital theory had implications not only in pointing at supposed internal contradiction of the marginal theory of…

Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) introduced the problem of classifying the members of a group in terms of the opinions of their potential members. This involves a finite set of agents $N = \{1,2,\ldots,n\}$, each one having an opinion about…

This article is addressing the problem of river sharing between two agents along a river in the presence of negative externalities. Where, each agent claims river water based on the hydrological characteristics of the territories. The…

Under very general conditions, we construct a micro-macro model for closed economy with a large number of heterogeneous agents. By introducing both financial capital (i.e. valued capital---- equities of firms) and physical capital (i.e.…