理论经济学
We use decision theory to confront uncertainty that is sufficiently broad to incorporate "models as approximations." We presume the existence of a featured collection of what we call "structured models" that have explicit substantive…
Models of stochastic choice typically use conditional choice probabilities given menus as the primitive for analysis, but in the field these are often hard to observe. Moreover, studying preferences over menus is not possible with this…
"Banning the Box" refers to a policy campaign aimed at prohibiting employers from soliciting applicant information that could be used to statistically discriminate against categories of applicants (in particular, those with criminal…
Algorithmic fairness is a new interdisciplinary field of study focused on how to measure whether a process, or algorithm, may unintentionally produce unfair outcomes, as well as whether or how the potential unfairness of such processes can…
While auction theory views bids and valuations as continuous variables, real-world auctions are necessarily discrete. In this paper, we use a combination of analytical and computational methods to investigate whether incorporating…
In this note we consider situations of (multidimensional) spatial majority voting. We show that under some assumptions usual in this literature, with an even number of voters if the core of the voting situation is singleton (and in the…
This paper studies the Random Utility Model (RUM) in a repeated stochastic choice situation, in which the decision maker is imperfectly informed about the payoffs of each available alternative. We develop a gradient-based learning algorithm…
We study how office-seeking parties use direct democracy to shape elections. A party with a strong electoral base can benefit from using a binding referendum to resolve issues that divide its core supporters. When referendums do not bind,…
`Rank and Yank' is practiced in many organizations. This paper is concerned with the condtions for none to be whipped by `Rank and Yank' when the evaluation data under each criterion are assumed to be ordinal rankings and the majority rule…
A sender flexibly acquires evidence--which she may pay a third party to certify--to disclose to a receiver. When evidence acquisition is overt, the receiver observes the evidence gathering process irrespective of whether its outcome is…
We study conditioning on null events, or surprises, and behaviorally characterize the Ordered Surprises (OS) representation of beliefs. For feasible events, our Decision Maker (DM) is Bayesian. For null events, our DM considers a hierarchy…
Having fixed capacities, homogeneous products and price sensitive customer purchase decision are primary distinguishing characteristics of numerous revenue management systems. Even with two or three rivals, competition is still highly…
We characterize decreasing impatience, a common behavioral phenomenon in intertemporal choice. Discount factors that display decreasing impatience are characterized through a convexit y axiom for investments at fixed interest rates. Then we…
It is well known that differences in the average number of friends among social groups can cause inequality in the average wage and/or unemployment rate. However, the impact of social network structure on inequality is not evident. In this…
Recent developments in the theory of production networks offer interesting applications and revival of input-output analysis. Some recent papers have studied the propagation of a temporary, negative shock through an input-output network.…
We study stable allocations in college admissions markets where students can attend the same college under different financial terms. The deferred acceptance algorithm identifies a stable allocation where funding is allocated based on…
A variety of social, economic, and political interactions have long been modelled after Blotto games. In this paper, we introduce a general model of dynamic $n$-player Blotto contests. The players have asymmetric resources, and the…
Recent literature shows that dynamic matching mechanisms may outperform the standard mechanisms to deliver desirable results. We highlight an under-explored design dimension, the time constraints that students face under such a dynamic…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
This paper examines whether one can learn to play an optimal action while only knowing part of true specification of the environment. We choose the optimal pricing problem as our laboratory, where the monopolist is endowed with an…