理论经济学
Motivated by data on coauthorships in scientific publications, we analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different…
Agents learn about a changing state using private signals and their neighbors' past estimates of the state. We present a model in which Bayesian agents in equilibrium use neighbors' estimates simply by taking weighted sums with…
We study the revenue comparison problem of auctions when the seller has a maxmin expected utility preference. The seller holds a set of priors around some reference belief, interpreted as an approximating model of the true probability law…
Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games have attracted attention as they arise in various competitive energy production settings in which players must make one or more discrete decisions. Gabriel et al. ["Solving discretely-constrained…
I prove an envelope theorem with a converse: the envelope formula is equivalent to a first-order condition. Like Milgrom and Segal's (2002) envelope theorem, my result requires no structure on the choice set. I use the converse envelope…
How and to what extent will new activities spread through social ties? Here, we develop a more sophisticated framework than the standard mean-field approach to describe the diffusion dynamics of multiple activities on complex networks. We…
In the era of a growing population, systemic changes to the world, and the rising risk of crises, humanity has been facing an unprecedented challenge of resource scarcity. Confronting and addressing the issues concerning the scarce…
A principal and an agent face symmetric uncertainty about the value of two correlated projects for the agent. The principal chooses which project values to publicly discover and makes a proposal to the agent, who accepts if and only if the…
We conduct an incentivized experiment on a nationally representative US sample \\ (N=708) to test whether people prefer to avoid ambiguity even when it means choosing dominated options. In contrast to the literature, we find that 55\% of…
We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence -- the order in which players update their actions -- is essentially irrelevant in determining whether…
A prevalent assumption in auction theory is that the auctioneer has full control over the market and that the allocation she dictates is final. In practice, however, agents might be able to resell acquired items in an aftermarket. A…
Using a general network model with multiple activities, we analyse a planner's welfare maximising interventions taking into account within-activity network spillovers and cross-activity interdependence. We show that the direction of the…
Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…
We study Nash implementation by stochastic mechanisms, and provide a surprisingly simple full characterization, which is in sharp contrast to the classical, albeit complicated, full characterization in Moore and Repullo (1990).
We study players interacting under the veil of ignorance, who have -- coarse -- beliefs represented as subsets of opponents' actions. We analyze when these players follow $\max \min$ or $\max\max$ decision criteria, which we identify with…
The Solow-Swan model is shortly reviewed from a mathematical point of view. By considering non-constant returns to scale, we obtain a general solution strategy. We then compute the exact solution for the Cobb-Douglas production function,…
We provide a syntactic construction of correlated equilibrium. For any finite game, we study how players coordinate their play on a signal by means of a public strategy whose instructions are expressed in some natural language. Language can…
We consider deterministic totally-ordered-time games. We present three axioms for strategies. We show that for any tuple of strategies that satisfy the axioms, there exists a unique complete history that is consistent with the strategy…
This paper builds a model of interactive belief hierarchies to derive the conditions under which judging an arbitrage opportunity requires Bayesian market participants to exercise their higher-order beliefs. As a Bayesian, an agent must…
Mill's classic argument for liberty requires that people's exercise of freedom should be governed by a no-harm principle (NHP). In this paper, we develop the concept of a no-harm equilibrium in $n$-person games where players maximize…