计算机科学与博弈论
This paper presents a Gaussian Process (GP) framework, a non-parametric technique widely acknowledged for regression and classification tasks, to address inverse problems in mean field games (MFGs). By leveraging GPs, we aim to recover…
The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee…
Vehicular edge computing (VEC) is emerging as a promising architecture of vehicular networks (VNs) by deploying the cloud computing resources at the edge of the VNs. This work aims to optimize resource allocation and task offloading in VEC…
Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate convergence guarantee in general games toward rationalizability,…
Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with them. These methods should guarantee fair representation of…
In this paper, we construct a winning condition $W$ over a finite set of colors such that, first, every finite arena has a strategy with 2 states of general memory which is optimal w.r.t.~$W$, and second, there exists no $k$ such that every…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We obtain novel approximation guarantees for three of the strongest fairness notions in discrete fair division, namely envy-free up to the removal of any…
We study the amount of entropy players asymptotically need to play a repeated normal-form game in a Nash equilibrium. Hub\'a\v{c}ek, Naor, and Ullman (SAGT'15, TCSys'16) gave sufficient conditions on a game for the minimal amount of…
Policy gradient methods enjoy strong practical performance in numerous tasks in reinforcement learning. Their theoretical understanding in multiagent settings, however, remains limited, especially beyond two-player competitive and potential…
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…
Many real-world auctions are dynamic processes, in which bidders interact and report information over multiple rounds with the auctioneer. The sequential decision making aspect paired with imperfect information renders analyzing the…
Recently, reputation-based indirect reciprocity has been widely applied to the study on fairness behavior. Previous works mainly investigate indirect reciprocity by considering compulsory participation. While in reality, individuals may…
We investigate a two-stage competitive model involving multiple contests. In this model, each contest designer chooses two participants from a pool of candidate contestants and determines the biases. Contestants strategically distribute…
The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness…
In 1964 Shapley devised a family of games for which fictitious play fails to converge to Nash equilibrium. The games are two-player non-zero-sum with 3 pure strategies per player. Shapley assumed that each player played a specific pure…
Peer prediction incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing are generally limited to eliciting samples from categorical distributions. Prior work on extending peer prediction to arbitrary distributions has largely relied on assumptions on the…
The behaviour of multi-agent learning in competitive network games is often studied within the context of zero-sum games, in which convergence guarantees may be obtained. However, outside of this class the behaviour of learning is known to…
Bilateral trade is one of the most natural and important forms of economic interaction: A seller has a single, indivisible item for sale, and a buyer is potentially interested. The two parties typically have different, privately known…
We provide the first large-scale data collection of real-world approval-based committee elections. These elections have been conducted on the Polkadot blockchain as part of their Nominated Proof-of-Stake mechanism and contain around one…
Coalitions naturally exist in many real-world systems involving multiple decision makers such as ridesharing, security, and online ad auctions, but the coalition structure among the agents is often unknown. We propose and study an important…