English

The Complexity of Tullock Contests

Computer Science and Game Theory 2026-03-10 v4

Abstract

Despite the extensive literature on Tullock contests, computational results for the general model with heterogeneous contestants remain scarce. This paper studies the algorithmic complexity of computing a pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) in such general Tullock contests. We find that the elasticity parameters {r_i}, which govern the returns to scale of contestants' production functions, play a decisive role in the problem's complexity. Our core conceptual insight is that the computational hardness is determined specifically by the number of contestants with medium elasticity (r_i \in (1, 2]). This is illustrated by a complete set of algorithmic results under two parameter regimes: -Efficient Regime: When the number of contestants with medium elasticity is logarithmically bounded by the total number of contestants (O(log n)), we provide an algorithm that determines the existence of a PNE and computes an epsilon-PNE in polynomial time in both n and log(1/epsilon) (i.e., Poly(n,log(1/epsilon))) whenever it exists. This result generalizes classical findings for concave (r_i <= 1) and convex (r_i > 2) cases, establishing computational tractability for a broader class of mixed-elasticity contests. -Hard Regime: In contrast, we show when the number of medium elasticity contestants exceed Omega(log n), determining the existence of PNEs is NP-complete and it is impossible for any algorithm to compute an epsilon-PNE within running time Poly(n,log(1/epsilon)). We then design a Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) that computes an epsilon-PNE in Poly(n,1/epsilon), guaranteeing efficient approximations for hard instances.

Cite

@article{arxiv.2412.06444,
  title  = {The Complexity of Tullock Contests},
  author = {Yu He and Fan Yao and Yang Yu and Xiaoyun Qiu and Minming Li and Haifeng Xu},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.06444},
  year   = {2026}
}
R2 v1 2026-06-28T20:27:48.705Z