Time Complexity Analysis of an Evolutionary Algorithm for approximating Nash Equilibriums
Computer Science and Game Theory
2021-10-27 v1 Computational Complexity
Abstract
The framework outlined in [arXiv:2010.13024] provides an approximation algorithm for computing Nash equilibria of normal form games. Since NASH is a well-known PPAD-complete problem, this framework has potential applications to other problems. The correctness of this framework has been empirically validated on 4 well-studied 2x2 games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Battle, and Chicken. In this paper, we provide the asymptotic time-complexities for these methods and in particular, verify that for 2x2 games the worst-case complexity is linear in the number of actions an agent can choose from.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2110.13563,
title = {Time Complexity Analysis of an Evolutionary Algorithm for approximating Nash Equilibriums},
author = {Aadesh Salecha},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2110.13563},
year = {2021}
}
Comments
3 pages, Time-Complexity extension of an IEEE/SSCI paper