On the Verification and Computation of Strong Nash Equilibrium
Computer Science and Game Theory
2017-11-20 v1
Abstract
Computing equilibria of games is a central task in computer science. A large number of results are known for \emph{Nash equilibrium} (NE). However, these can be adopted only when coalitions are not an issue. When instead agents can form coalitions, NE is inadequate and an appropriate solution concept is \emph{strong Nash equilibrium} (SNE). Few computational results are known about SNE. In this paper, we first study the problem of verifying whether a strategy profile is an SNE, showing that the problem is in . We then design a spatial branch--and--bound algorithm to find an SNE, and we experimentally evaluate the algorithm.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1711.06318,
title = {On the Verification and Computation of Strong Nash Equilibrium},
author = {Nicola Gatti and Marco Rocco and Tuomas Sandholm},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.06318},
year = {2017}
}