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Fictitious play with reinforcement learning is a general and effective framework for zero-sum games. However, using the current deep neural network models, the implementation of fictitious play faces crucial challenges. Neural network model…

We present a novel bilateral negotiation model that allows a self-interested agent to learn how to negotiate over multiple issues in the presence of user preference uncertainty. The model relies upon interpretable strategy templates…

Strategic interaction in adversarial domains such as law, diplomacy, and negotiation is mediated by language, yet most game-theoretic models abstract away the mechanisms of persuasion that operate through discourse. We present the Strategic…

By classic results in social choice theory, any reasonable preferential voting method sometimes gives individuals an incentive to report an insincere preference. The extent to which different voting methods are more or less resistant to…

Competitive multi-agent reinforcement learning in imperfect-information games requires agents to act under partial observability and against adversarial opponents, necessitating stochastic policies. While self-play reinforcement learning…

Transformer models have demonstrated impressive capabilities when trained at scale, excelling at difficult cognitive tasks requiring complex reasoning and rational decision-making. In this paper, we explore the application of transformers…

When developing reinforcement learning agents, the standard approach is to train an agent to converge to a fixed policy that is as close to optimal as possible for a single fixed reward function. If different agent behaviour is required in…

We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other…

Optimizing artificial intelligence (AI) for dynamic environments remains a fundamental challenge in machine learning research. In this paper, we examine evolutionary training methods for optimizing AI to solve the game 2048, a 2D sliding…

Standard simulations of the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) operate in deterministic, noise-free environments, producing strategies that may be theoretically optimal but fragile when confronted with real-world uncertainty. This paper…

In this work, we propose and evaluate a new reinforcement learning method, COMPact Experience Replay (COMPER), which uses temporal difference learning with predicted target values based on recurrence over sets of similar transitions, and a…

This work proposes a scheme that allows learning complex multi-agent behaviors in a sample efficient manner, applied to 2v2 soccer. The problem is formulated as a Markov game, and solved using deep reinforcement learning. We propose a basic…

While Large Language Models (LLMs) hold promise to become autonomous agents, they often explore suboptimally in sequential decision-making. Recent work has sought to enhance this capability via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement…

Multi-agent systems exhibit complex behaviors that emanate from the interactions of multiple agents in a shared environment. In this work, we are interested in controlling one agent in a multi-agent system and successfully learn to interact…

This paper presents an intelligent and adaptive agent that employs deception to recognize a cyber adversary's intent. Unlike previous approaches to cyber deception, which mainly focus on delaying or confusing the attackers, we focus on…

We study the problem of designing autonomous agents that can learn to cooperate effectively with a potentially suboptimal partner while having no access to the joint reward function. This problem is modeled as a cooperative episodic…

The usage of automated learning agents is becoming increasingly prevalent in many online economic applications such as online auctions and automated trading. Motivated by such applications, this paper is dedicated to fundamental modeling…

How does information regarding an adversary's intentions affect optimal system design? This paper addresses this question in the context of graphical coordination games where an adversary can indirectly influence the behavior of agents by…

We study information design settings where the designer controls information about a state, and there are multiple agents interacting in a game who are privately informed about their types. Each agent's utility depends on all agents' types…

We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…