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Regret-based algorithms are highly efficient at finding approximate Nash equilibria in sequential games such as poker games. However, most regret-based algorithms, including counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) and its variants, rely on…

We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…

This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in Cournot games with continuous actions. Cournot games are the essential model for many socio-economic systems, where players compete by strategically setting their output quantity.…

Motivated by Generative Adversarial Networks, we study the computation of Nash equilibrium in concave network zero-sum games (NZSGs), a multiplayer generalization of two-player zero-sum games first proposed with linear payoffs. Extending…

We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, although its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all…

In this paper, the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problem for continuous games with coupled affine inequality constraints is investigated in a partial-decision information scenario, where each player can only access its…

Self-play via online learning is one of the premier ways to solve large-scale two-player zero-sum games, both in theory and practice. Particularly popular algorithms include optimistic multiplicative weights update (OMWU) and optimistic…

Long studied as a toy model, quantum zero-sum games have recently resurfaced as a canonical playground for modern areas such as non-local games, quantum interactive proofs, and quantum machine learning. In this simple yet fundamental…

This paper studies the last-iterate convergence properties of the exponential weights algorithm with constant learning rates. We consider a repeated interaction in discrete time, where each player uses an exponential weights algorithm…

In this paper, we deepen the analysis of continuous time Fictitious Play learning algorithm to the consideration of various finite state Mean Field Game settings (finite horizon, $\gamma$-discounted), allowing in particular for the…

We introduce a generalization of zero-sum network multiagent matrix games and prove that alternating gradient descent converges to the set of Nash equilibria at rate $O(1/T)$ for this set of games. Alternating gradient descent obtains this…

We investigate the convergence of symmetric stochastic differential games with interactions via control, where the volatility terms of both idiosyncratic and common noises are controlled. We apply the stochastic maximum principle, following…

Reinforcement-based learning dynamics may exhibit several limitations when applied in a distributed setup. In (repeatedly-played) multi-player/action strategic-form games, and when each player applies an independent copy of the learning…

Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate convergence guarantee in general games toward rationalizability,…

In this paper, we study a class of linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field games of controls with common noises and their corresponding $N$-player games. The theory of mean field game of controls considers a class of mean field games where the…

This paper studies the Nash equilibrium seeking problem for stochastic games under heavy-tailed noise. The gradient noise is considered to have a finite $\delta$-th moment ($1<\delta\le 2$), which generalizes the Gaussian noise and covers…

Simple stochastic games can be solved by value iteration (VI), which yields a sequence of under-approximations of the value of the game. This sequence is guaranteed to converge to the value only in the limit. Since no stopping criterion is…

Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we…

We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…

This paper considers risk-averse learning in convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their individual risk of incurring significantly high costs. Specifically, the agents adopt the conditional value at risk (CVaR) as a…