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We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

Recent years have seen increased interest in performance guarantees of gradient descent algorithms for non-convex optimization. A number of works have uncovered that gradient noise plays a critical role in the ability of gradient descent…

In this paper, we study last-iterate convergence of learning algorithms in bilinear saddle-point problems, a preferable notion of convergence that captures the day-to-day behavior of learning dynamics. We focus on the challenging setting…

In this work, we introduce a new variant of online gradient descent, which provably converges to Nash Equilibria and simultaneously attains sublinear regret for the class of congestion games in the semi-bandit feedback setting. Our proposed…

We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…

First-order methods for stochastic optimization have undeniable relevance, in part due to their pivotal role in machine learning. Variance reduction for these algorithms has become an important research topic. In contrast to common…

This paper examines the long-run behavior of learning with bandit feedback in non-cooperative concave games. The bandit framework accounts for extremely low-information environments where the agents may not even know they are playing a…

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret…

We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games; (2) lacking the no-regret guarantee; (3) having only asymptotic or slow…

This paper proposes Mutation-Driven Multiplicative Weights Update (M2WU) for learning an equilibrium in two-player zero-sum normal-form games and proves that it exhibits the last-iterate convergence property in both full and noisy feedback…

We tackle a fundamental problem in empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), that of learning equilibria of simulation-based games. Such games cannot be described in analytical form; instead, a black-box simulator can be queried to obtain…

We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games and propose a two-timescale $Q$-learning algorithm with function approximation that is payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. In two-timescale…

We consider a class of smooth $N$-player noncooperative games, where player objectives are expectation-valued and potentially nonconvex. In such a setting, we consider the largely open question of efficiently computing a suitably defined…

We consider strongly monotone games with convex separable coupling constraints, played by dynamical agents, in a partial-decision information scenario. We start by designing continuous-time fully distributed feedback controllers, based on…

Most of the literature on learning in games has focused on the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Much less is known about the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in dynamic multiagent…

We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical…

This paper investigates the equilibrium convergence properties of a proposed algorithm for potential games with continuous strategy spaces in the presence of feedback delays, a main challenge in multi-agent systems that compromises the…

We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…

We analyze the last-iterate convergence of the Anchored Gradient Descent Ascent algorithm for smooth convex-concave min-max problems. While previous work established a last-iterate rate of $\mathcal{O}(1/t^{2-2p})$ for the squared gradient…