Related papers: Last-Iterate Guarantees for Learning in Co-coerciv…

The main goal of this paper is to study a stochastic game connected to a system of forward backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) involving delay and so-called noisy memory. We derive suffcient and necessary maximum principles…

Learning in multi-player games can model a large variety of practical scenarios, where each player seeks to optimize its own local objective function, which at the same time relies on the actions taken by others. Motivated by the frequent…

We introduce quantitative reductions, a novel technique for structuring the space of quantitative games and solving them that does not rely on a reduction to qualitative games. We show that such reductions exhibit the same desirable…

While classic work in convex-concave min-max optimization relies on average-iterate convergence results, the emergence of nonconvex applications such as training Generative Adversarial Networks has led to renewed interest in last-iterate…

Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a…

Recently, invariant risk minimization (IRM) (Arjovsky et al.) was proposed as a promising solution to address out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization. In Ahuja et al., it was shown that solving for the Nash equilibria of a new class of…

We consider quadratic, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems with symmetric interactions among the agents. Albeit this class of games is known to admit a potential function, its formal expression can be unavailable in several…

We consider generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with strongly monotone pseudo-gradients and jointly linear coupling constraints. We establish the convergence rate of a payoff-based approach intended to learn a variational…

Monotone variational inequalities (VIs) provide a unifying framework for convex minimization, equilibrium computation, and convex-concave saddle-point problems. Extragradient-type methods are among the most effective first-order algorithms…

We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…

We study high-probability convergence guarantees of learning on streaming data in the presence of heavy-tailed noise. In the proposed scenario, the model is updated in an online fashion, as new information is observed, without storing any…

In an inverse game problem, one needs to infer the cost function of the players in a game such that a desired joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium. We study the inverse game problem for a class of multiplayer matrix games, where the cost…

We study generalized games with full row rank equality constraints and we provide a strikingly simple proof of strong monotonicity of the associated KKT operator. This allows us to show linear convergence to a variational equilibrium of the…

We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of (pure Nash) equilibria is guaranteed by potential…

We study model-based and model-free policy optimization in a class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games called linear quadratic (LQ) deep structured games. In such games, players interact with each other through a set of weighted…

We study momentum-based first-order optimization algorithms in which the iterations utilize information from the two previous steps and are subject to an additive white noise. This setup uses noise to account for uncertainty in either…

The convergence of online learning algorithms in games under self-play is a fundamental question in game theory and machine learning. Among various notions of convergence, last-iterate convergence is particularly desirable, as it reflects…

We study the convergence problem for mean field games with common noise and controlled volatility. We adopt the strategy recently put forth by Lauri\`ere and the second author, using the maximum principle to recast the convergence problem…

We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…

We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. To incorporate function approximation, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward…