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In this paper, we consider multi-agent learning via online gradient descent in a class of games called $\lambda$-cocoercive games, a fairly broad class of games that admits many Nash equilibria and that properly includes unconstrained…
In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…
We consider a general-sum N-player linear-quadratic game with stochastic dynamics over a finite horizon and prove the global convergence of the natural policy gradient method to the Nash equilibrium. In order to prove the convergence of the…
We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, the convergence of the…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…
This paper investigates the convergence time of log-linear learning to an $\epsilon$-efficient Nash equilibrium in potential games, where an efficient Nash equilibrium is defined as the maximizer of the potential function. Previous…
Last-iterate convergence has received extensive study in two player zero-sum games starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical methods that exhibit last-iterate convergence for the…
We address learning Nash equilibria in convex games under the payoff information setting. We consider the case in which the game pseudo-gradient is monotone but not necessarily strictly monotone. This relaxation of strict monotonicity…
Zero-sum Linear Quadratic (LQ) games are fundamental in optimal control and can be used (i)~as a dynamic game formulation for risk-sensitive or robust control and (ii)~as a benchmark setting for multi-agent reinforcement learning with two…
We derive the rate of convergence to the strongly variationally stable Nash equilibrium in a convex game, for a zeroth-order learning algorithm. Though we do not assume strong monotonicity of the game, our rates for the one-point feedback…
We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for…
We study stochastic effects on the lagging anchor dynamics, a reinforcement learning algorithm used to learn successful strategies in iterated games, which is known to converge to Nash points in the absence of noise. The dynamics is…
This paper presents a payoff perturbation technique, introducing a strong convexity to players' payoff functions in games. This technique is specifically designed for first-order methods to achieve last-iterate convergence in games where…
The theory of integral quadratic constraints (IQCs) allows the certification of exponential convergence of interconnected systems containing nonlinear or uncertain elements. In this work, we adapt the IQC theory to study first-order methods…
Towards characterizing the optimization landscape of games, this paper analyzes the stability of gradient-based dynamics near fixed points of two-player continuous games. We introduce the quadratic numerical range as a method to…
Behavioral diversity, expert imitation, fairness, safety goals and others give rise to preferences in sequential decision making domains that do not decompose additively across time. We introduce the class of convex Markov games that allow…
Zero-sum games are a fundamental setting for adversarial training and decision-making in multi-agent learning (MAL). Existing methods often ensure convergence to (approximate) Nash equilibria by introducing a form of regularization. Yet,…
We study infinite-horizon discounted two-player zero-sum Markov games, and develop a decentralized algorithm that provably converges to the set of Nash equilibria under self-play. Our algorithm is based on running an Optimistic Gradient…
Bargaining games, where agents attempt to agree on how to split utility, are an important class of games used to study economic behavior, which motivates a study of online learning algorithms in these games. In this work, we tackle when…