Related papers: Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pair…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
The binary relation framework has been shown to be applicable to many real-life preference handling scenarios. Here we study preference contraction: the problem of discarding selected preferences. We argue that the property of minimality…
We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the…
In this paper the stable extended domain of a noncommutative rational function is introduced and it is shown that it can be completely described by a monic linear pencil from the minimal realization of the function. This result amends the…
We study a two-sided matching model where one side of the market (hospitals) has combinatorial preferences over the other side (doctors). Specifically, we consider the setting where hospitals have matroid rank valuations over the doctors,…
Consider a one-to-one two-sided matching market with workers on one side and single-position firms on the other, and suppose that the largest individually rational matching contains $n$ pairs. We show that the number of workers employed and…
Two-sided manufacturing-as-a-service (MaaS) marketplaces connect clients requesting manufacturing services to suppliers providing those services. Matching mechanisms i.e. allocation of clients' orders to suppliers is a key design parameter…
We introduce a novel choice dataset, called joint choice, in which options and menus are multidimensional. In this general setting, we define a notion of choice separability, which requires that selections from some dimensions are never…
We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they…
Super-stability and strong stability are properties of a matching in the stable matching problem with ties. In this paper, we introduce a common generalization of super-stability and strong stability, which we call non-uniform stability.…
This paper develops a framework for repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived hospitals match with a new generation of short-lived residents in every period. I show…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…
We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An $(a,b)$-supermatch is a stable matching in which if $a$ pairs break up it is possible to find another stable…
This paper extends deterministic notions of Strong Stability Preservation (SSP) to the stochastic setting, enabling nonlinearly stable numerical solutions to stochastic differential equations (SDEs) and stochastic partial differential…
We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom when one side (a firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (a worker or doctor). In a standard model, monetary transfers are not…
This paper considers two-sided matching with budget constraints where one side (firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (worker or doctor). In a standard model, while multiple doctors can be matched to a…
Maximizing monotone submodular functions under cardinality constraints is a classic optimization task with several applications in data mining and machine learning. In this paper we study this problem in a dynamic environment with…
The theory of optimal choice sets offers a well-established solution framework in social choice and game theory. In social choice theory, decision-making is typically modeled as a maximization problem. However, when preferences are cyclic…
Stability of the utility maximization problem with random endowment and indifference prices is studied for a sequence of financial markets in an incomplete Brownian setting. Our novelty lies in the nonequivalence of markets, in which the…