Related papers: Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pair…
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…
Balanced and swap-robust minimal trades, introduced in [1], are important for studying the balance and stability of server access request protocols under data popularity changes. Constructions of such trades have so far relied on paired…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on…
Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts in matching markets. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various solution concepts in trading networks-multi-sided matching markets with…
We unify and establish equivalence between the pathwise and the quasi-sure approaches to robust modelling of financial markets in discrete time. In particular, we prove a Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing and a Superhedging Theorem,…
We consider the pricing of derivatives in a setting with trading restrictions, but without any probabilistic assumptions on the underlying model, in discrete and continuous time. In particular, we assume that European put or call options…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
We consider the existence and stability of static configurations of a scalar field in a five dimensional spacetime in which the extra spatial dimension is compactified on an $S^1/Z_2$ orbifold. For a wide class of potentials with multiple…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
Value-based static analysis techniques express computed program invariants as logical formula over program variables. Researchers and practitioners use these invariants to aid in software engineering and verification tasks. When selecting…
We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that get finalized when a…
We address the stability problem for linear switching systems with mode-dependent restrictions on the switching intervals. Their lengths can be bounded as from below (the guaranteed dwell-time) as from above. The upper bounds make this…
We consider an economic environment with one buyer and one seller. For a bundle $(t,q)\in [0,\infty[\times [0,1]=\mathbb{Z}$, $q$ refers to the winning probability of an object, and $t$ denotes the payment that the buyer makes. We consider…
We consider popular matching problems in both bipartite and non-bipartite graphs with strict preference lists. It is known that every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. A subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
We introduce and study a notion of duality for two classes of optimization problems commonly occurring in probability theory. That is, on an abstract measurable space $(\Omega,\mathcal{F})$, we consider pairs $(E,\mathcal{G})$ where $E$ is…
Since Choo and Siow (2006), a burgeoning literature has analyzed matching markets when utility is perfectly transferable and the joint surplus is separable. We take stock of recent methodological developments in this area. Combining…