Related papers: Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pair…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…
A common assumption in modern microeconomic theory is that choice should be rationalizable via a binary preference relation, which \citeauthor{Sen71a} showed to be equivalent to two consistency conditions, namely $\alpha$ (contraction) and…
This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding language to truthfully express their…
We study the Student Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S), which involves the assignment of students to projects based on student preferences over projects, lecturer preferences over students, and…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
Some aspects of the problem of stable marriage are discussed. There are two distinguished marriage plans: the fully transferable case, where money can be transferred between the participants, and the fully non transferable case where each…
Superposition is an established decision procedure for a variety of first-order logic theories represented by sets of clauses. A satisfiable theory, saturated by superposition, implicitly defines a minimal term-generated model for the…
We consider a general framework of optimal mechanism design under adverse selection and ambiguity about the type distribution of agents. We prove the existence of optimal mechanisms under minimal assumptions on the contract space and prove…
We study the problem of pure exploration in matching markets under uncertain preferences, where the goal is to identify a stable matching with confidence parameter $\delta$ and minimal sample complexity. Agents learn preferences via…
We study a stochastic variant of monotone submodular maximization problem as follows. We are given a monotone submodular function as an objective function and a feasible domain defined on a finite set, and our goal is to find a feasible…
Consider the stable matching problem on two sets. We introduce the concept of a preference cycle and show how its natural presence in stable matchings proves a series of classical results in an elementary way.
A combinatorial trade is a pair of sets of blocks of elements that can be exchanged while preserving relevant subset intersection constraints. The class of balanced and swap-robust minimal trades was proposed in [1] for exchanging blocks of…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
Dependence on the parameter is continuous when perturbations of the parameter preserves strict preference for one alternative over another. We characterise this property via a utility function over alternatives that depends continuously on…
Dynamic pricing schemes were introduced as an alternative to posted-price mechanisms. In contrast to static models, the dynamic setting allows to update the prices between buyer-arrivals based on the remaining sets of items and buyers, and…
The primary contribution of this paper resides in devising constant-factor approximation guarantees for revenue maximization in two-sided matching markets, under general pairwise rewards. A major distinction between our work and…
This paper investigates the stability properties of the spectrum of the classical Steklov problem under domain perturbation. We find conditions which guarantee the spectral stability and we show their optimality. We emphasize the fact that…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…
We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a…