Related papers: The Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Primary El…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…
In the Binary Networked Public Goods game, every player needs to decide if she participates in a public project whose utility is shared equally by the community. We study the problem of deciding if there exists a pure strategy Nash…
The recently defined class of integer programming games (IPG) models situations where multiple self-interested decision makers interact, with their strategy sets represented by a finite set of linear constraints together with integer…
One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…
We study the complexity of equilibrium computation in discrete preference games. These games were introduced by Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Oren (EC '13, JCSS '18) to model decision-making by agents in a social network that choose a…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, although its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all…
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
In this paper, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two…
The Hotelling-Downs model is a natural and appealing model for understanding strategic positioning by candidates in elections. In this model, voters are distributed on a line, representing their ideological position on an issue. Each…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
Performative prediction captures the phenomenon where deploying a predictive model shifts the underlying data distribution. While simple retraining dynamics are known to converge linearly when the performative effects are weak ($\rho < 1$),…
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In…
We consider a scheduling game on parallel related machines, in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide on the order according to…
Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions.…
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…
We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2019,…