Related papers: The Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Primary El…
The Nash equilibrium problem is a widely used tool to model non-cooperative games. Many solution methods have been proposed in the literature to compute solutions of Nash equilibrium problems with continuous strategy sets, but, besides some…
In this paper we consider strong Nash equilibria, in mixed strategies, for finite games. Any strong Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient for each coalition. First, we analyze the two--player setting. Our main result, in its simplest…
Electric boolean games are compact representations of games where the players have qualitative objectives described by LTL formulae and have limited resources. We study the complexity of several decision problems related to the analysis of…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
The optimization of power systems involves complex uncertainties, such as technological progress, political context, geopolitical constraints. Negotiations at COP21 are complicated by the huge number of scenarios that various people want to…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and…
We introduce a class of resource games where resources and preferences are specified with the language of a resource-sensitive logic. The agents are endowed with a bag of resources and try to achieve a resource objective. For each agent, an…
We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices as possible,…
We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We study the computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equilibria in $m$-player games. Several such problems have recently been shown to be computationally equivalent to the decision problem for the existential theory of the…
We study the impact of strategic behavior in labor markets characterized by algorithmic monoculture, where firms compete for a shared pool of applicants using a common algorithmic evaluation. In this setting, "naive" hiring strategies lead…
This is a short introduction to the subject of strategic games. We focus on the concepts of best response, Nash equilibrium, strict and weak dominance, and mixed strategies, and study the relation between these concepts in the context of…
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products,…
We study two natural problems about rational behaviors in multiplayer non-zero-sum sequential infinite duration games played on graphs: checking problems, that consist in deciding whether a strategy profile, defined by a Mealy machine, is…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
We revisit the complexity of deciding, given a {\it bimatrix game,} whether it has a {\it Nash equilibrium} with certain natural properties; such decision problems were early known to be ${\mathcal{NP}}$-hard~\cite{GZ89}. We show that…
A fundamental shortcoming of the concept of Nash equilibrium is its computational intractability: approximating Nash equilibria in normal-form games is PPAD-hard. In this paper, inspired by the ideas of smoothed analysis, we introduce a…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…