On Parameterized Complexity of Binary Networked Public Goods Game
Abstract
In the Binary Networked Public Goods game, every player needs to decide if she participates in a public project whose utility is shared equally by the community. We study the problem of deciding if there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in such games. The problem is already known to be NP-complete. We provide fine-grained analysis of this problem under the lens of parameterized complexity theory. We consider various natural graph parameters and show either W[1]-hardness or exhibit an FPT algorithm. We finally exhibit some special graph classes, for example path, cycle, bi-clique, complete graph, etc., which always have a PSNE if the utility function of the players are fully homogeneous.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2012.01880,
title = {On Parameterized Complexity of Binary Networked Public Goods Game},
author = {Arnab Maiti and Palash Dey},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2012.01880},
year = {2021}
}
Comments
24 pages, 1 figure, will appear as full paper in AAMAS 2022