Related papers: Unregularized Linear Convergence in Zero-Sum Game …

We provide a theoretical framework for Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Our analysis shows that when the true reward function is linear, the widely used maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) converges under both the…

We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…

This paper studies reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) for aligning large language models with human preferences. While RLHF has demonstrated promising results, many algorithms are highly sensitive to misspecifications in the…

Aligning large language models (LLMs) to serve users with heterogeneous and potentially conflicting preferences is a central challenge for personalized and trustworthy AI. We formalize an ideal notion of universal alignment through…

We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…

We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, the convergence of the…

Human preference alignment is essential to improve the interaction quality of large language models (LLMs). Existing alignment methods depend on manually annotated preference data to guide the LLM optimization directions. However,…

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a key technique for aligning the output of large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. To learn the reward function, most existing RLHF algorithms use the…

This work studies the challenge of aligning large language models (LLMs) with offline preference data. We focus on alignment by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) in particular. While popular preference optimization methods…

Bargaining games, where agents attempt to agree on how to split utility, are an important class of games used to study economic behavior, which motivates a study of online learning algorithms in these games. In this work, we tackle when…

A key challenge in training Large Language Models (LLMs) is properly aligning them with human preferences. Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) uses pairwise comparisons from human annotators to train reward functions and has…

Despite notable advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), most state-of-the-art models have not undergone thorough alignment with human preferences. This gap exists because current alignment research has primarily achieved…

Learning from human feedback (LHF) -- and in particular learning from pairwise preferences -- has recently become a crucial ingredient in training large language models (LLMs), and has been the subject of much research. Most recent works…

While extensive-form games (EFGs) can be converted into normal-form games (NFGs), doing so comes at the cost of an exponential blowup of the strategy space. So, progress on NFGs and EFGs has historically followed separate tracks, with the…

Aligning the behavior of Large language models (LLMs) with human intentions and values remains a critical challenge. Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) aligns LLMs by training a reward model (RM) on human preferences and…

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a prevalent approach to align AI systems with human values by learning rewards from human preference data. Due to various reasons, however, such data typically takes the form of rankings…

We present volume analyses of Multiplicative Weights Updates (MWU) and Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Updates (OMWU) in zero-sum as well as coordination games. Such analyses provide new insights into these game dynamical systems, which…

We prove that optimistic-follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL), together with smooth value updates, finds an $O(T^{-1})$-approximate Nash equilibrium in $T$ iterations for two-player zero-sum Markov games with full information. This…

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is crucial for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values. However, RLHF has been continuously challenged by its high complexity in implementation and computation consumption,…

Learning from repeated play in a fixed two-player zero-sum game is a classic problem in game theory and online learning. We consider a variant of this problem where the game payoff matrix changes over time, possibly in an adversarial…