Related papers: Evolutionary Dynamics in Continuous-time Finite-st…
Evolutionary games are a developing sub-field of game theory. This branch of game theory is used in the study of the adaptation of large, but finite, populations of agents to changes in the environment. It assumes that each agent has no…
Predicting selfish behavior in public environments by considering Nash equilibria is a central concept of game theory. For the dynamic traffic assignment problem modeled by a flow over time game, in which every particle tries to reach its…
We are interested in the study of stochastic games for which each player faces an optimal stopping problem. In our setting, the players may interact through the criterion to optimise as well as through their dynamics. After briefly…
We investigate how the framework of mean-field games may be used to investigate strategic interactions in large heterogeneous populations. We consider strategic interactions in a population of players which may be partitioned into…
Mean field equilibrium (MFE) has emerged as a computationally tractable solution concept for large dynamic games. However, computing MFE remains challenging due to nonlinearities and the absence of contraction properties, limiting its…
We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called `stochastic slowdown' effect, previously observed in (Altrock et. al, 2010) for simple evolutionary dynamics. Slowdown here refers to the fact that a…
This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
In this paper, we consider finite-strategy approximations of infinite-strategy evolutionary games. We prove that such approximations converge to the true dynamics over finite-time intervals, under mild regularity conditions which are…
In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with the risk-sensitive optimality criterion. We introduce risk-sensitivity behaviour for each agent via an exponential utility function. In the game model, each…
We introduce a new mean field kinetic model for systems of rational agents interacting in a game theoretical framework. This model is inspired from non-cooperative anonymous games with a continuum of players and Mean-Field Games. The large…
This paper investigates stochastic generalized dynamic games with coupling chance constraints, where agents have incomplete information about uncertainties satisfying a concentration of measure property. This problem, in general, is…
First order kinetic mean field games formally describe the Nash equilibria of deterministic differential games where agents control their acceleration, asymptotically in the limit as the number of agents tends to infinity. The known results…
Motivated by applications in job scheduling, queuing networks, and load balancing in cyber-physical systems, we develop and analyze a game-theoretic framework to balance the load among servers in static and dynamic settings. In these…
The idea of evolutionarily stable state (ESS) of a population is a cornerstone of evolutionary game theory; moreover, it coincides with the game-theoretic concept of Nash equilibrium. Such a state corresponds to a strategy adopted by the…
For a mean field game model with a major and infinite minor players, we characterize a notion of Nash equilibrium via a system of so-called master equations, namely a system of nonlinear transport equations in the space of measures. Then,…
Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…
The standard solution concept for stochastic games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE); however, its computation becomes intractable as the number of players increases. Instead, we consider mean field equilibrium (MFE) that has been…
We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly…
Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are defined to predict the outcome of such situations.…