Related papers: Evolutionary Dynamics in Continuous-time Finite-st…
The minimum-effort coordination game, having potentially important implications in both evolutionary biology and sociology, draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the…
In game theory, an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES set) is a set of Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies that give the same payoffs. Similar to an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ES strategy), an ES set is also a strict NE. This work investigates…
The Letter presents a novel way to connect random walks, stochastic differential equations, and evolutionary game theory. We introduce a new concept of potential function for discrete-space stochastic systems. It is based on a…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes the spreading of successful strategies in a population of reproducing individuals. Typically, the microscopic definition of strategy spreading is stochastic, such that the dynamics becomes deterministic…
We consider in discrete time, a general class of sequential stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information with the following features. The underlying system has Markovian dynamics controlled by the agents' joint actions. Each agent's…
We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…
We consider N-player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {-1,1}. If there is uniqueness of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the…
We introduce a mean field model for optimal holding of a representative agent of her peers as a natural expected scaling limit from the corresponding $N-$agent model. The induced mean field dynamics appear naturally in a form which is not…
People choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. The process can be modelled as an evolutionary game dynamics system, which may be…
We study the distribution of strategies in a large game that models how agents choose among different double auction markets. We classify the possible mean field Nash equilibria, which include potentially segregated states where an agent…
Mean field games is a recent area of study introduced by Lions and Lasry in a series of seminal papers in 2006. Mean field games model situations of competition between large number of rational agents that play non-cooperative dynamic games…
We propose a new mean-field game model with two states to study synchronization phenomena, and we provide a comprehensive characterization of stationary and dynamic equilibria along with their stability properties. The game undergoes a…
We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean…
We study continuous stochastic games with heterogeneous mean field interactions and jumps on large networks and explore their limit counterparts. We introduce the graphon game model based on a controlled graphon mean field stochastic…
We introduce an analytical model to study the evolution towards equilibrium in spatial games, with `memory-aware' agents, i.e., agents that accumulate their payoff over time. In particular, we focus our attention on the spatial Prisoner's…
A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than $\epsilon$ by…
We consider N-player non-zero sum games played on finite trees (i.e., sequential games), in which the players have the right to repeatedly update their respective strategies (for instance, to improve the outcome wrt to the current strategy…
Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spatial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
Mean field game theory studies the behavior of a large number of interacting individuals in a game theoretic setting and has received a lot of attention in the past decade (Lasry and Lions, Japanese journal of mathematics, 2007). In this…