Related papers: Evolutionary Dynamics in Continuous-time Finite-st…
This paper investigates an energy conservation and dissipation -- passivity -- aspect of dynamic models in evolutionary game theory. We define a notion of passivity using the state-space representation of the models, and we devise…
The framework of multi-agent learning explores the dynamics of how individual agent strategies evolve in response to the evolving strategies of other agents. Of particular interest is whether or not agent strategies converge to well known…
We present the concept of a Generalized Feedback Nash Equilibrium (GFNE) in dynamic games, extending the Feedback Nash Equilibrium concept to games in which players are subject to state and input constraints. We formalize necessary and…
To our knowledge, the populations are generally assumed to be homogeneous in the traditional approach to evolutionary game dynamics. Here, we focus on the inhomogeneous populations. A simple model which can describe the inhomogeneity of the…
We study a class of dynamic decision problems of mean field type with time inconsistent cost functionals, and derive a stochastic maximum principle to characterize subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points. Subsequently, this approach is…
We investigate mean field games for players, who are weakly coupled via their empirical measure. To this end we investigate time-dependent pure jump type propagators over a finite space in the framework of non-linear Markov processes. We…
We consider a game for a continuum of non-identical players evolving on a finite state space. Their heterogeneous interactions are represented by a graphon, which can be viewed as the limit of a dense random graph. The player's transition…
Mean-field game theory relies on approximating games that are intractable to model due to a very large to infinite population of players. While these kinds of games can be solved analytically via the associated system of partial…
Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…
We prove the existence of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of general-sum Bayesian games with continuous types and finite actions under the conditions that the utility functions and the prior type distributions are continuous concerning the…
Population games can be regarded as a tool to study the strategic interaction of a population of players. Although several attention has been given to such field, most of the available works have focused only on the unconstrained case. That…
We discuss similarities and differencies between systems of many interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We analyze long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many…
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two…
We propose a reinforcement learning algorithm for stationary mean-field games, where the goal is to learn a pair of mean-field state and stationary policy that constitutes the Nash equilibrium. When viewing the mean-field state and the…
In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with a finite number $N$ of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish…
In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…
The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…
We study mean field games and corresponding $N$-player games in continuous time over a finite time horizon where the position of each agent belongs to a finite state space. As opposed to previous works on finite state mean field games, we…
Given a large number of homogeneous players that are distributed across three possible states, we consider the problem in which these players have to control their transition rates, while minimizing a cost. The optimal transition rates are…
We study effects of strategy-dependent time delays on equilibria of evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations in dynamical systems. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of…