Related papers: Extending Games beyond the Finite Horizon
In view of the complexity of the dynamics of learning in games, we seek to decompose a game into simpler components where the dynamics' long-run behavior is well understood. A natural starting point for this is Helmholtz's theorem, which…
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…
This paper investigates the interplay between sequential hypothesis testing (SHT) and adversarial decision-making in partially observable games, focusing on the deceptive strategies of red and blue teams. Inspired by Sun Zi's The Art of War…
As we show using the notion of equilibrium in the theory of infinite sequential games, bubbles and escalations are rational for economic and environmental agents, who believe in an infinite world. This goes against a vision of a self…
We present a novel coalgebraic formulation of infinite extensive games. We define both the game trees and the strategy profiles by possibly infinite systems of corecursive equations. Certain strategy profiles are proved to be subgame…
This paper uses category theory to develop an entirely new approach to approximate game theory. Game theory is the study of how different agents within a multi-agent system take decisions. At its core, game theory asks what an optimal…
In this paper, we discuss a well-known self-referential paradox in foundational game theory, the Brandenburger - Keisler paradox. We approach the paradox from two different perspectives: non-well-founded set theory and paraconsistent logic.…
This paper specifies an extensive form as a 5-ary relation (that is, as a set of quintuples) which satisfies eight abstract axioms. Each quintuple is understood to list a player, a situation (that is, a name for an information set), a…
We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games, where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider…
This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each other's strategies…
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…
We develop a minimal, timeless game-theoretic representation of the mass-geometry relation. An "Object" (mass) and "Space" (geometry) choose strategies in a static normal-form game; utilities encode stability as mutual consistency rather…
We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…
Algorithmic game theory (AGT) focuses on the design and analysis of algorithms for interacting agents, with interactions rigorously formalized within the framework of games. Results from AGT find applications in domains such as online…
Two-player graph games have found numerous applications, most notably in the synthesis of reactive systems from temporal specifications, but also in verification. The relevance of infinite-state systems in these areas has lead to…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
We study the problem of computing optimal correlated equilibria (CEs) in infinite-horizon multi-player stochastic games, where correlation signals are provided over time. In this setting, optimal CEs require history-dependent policies; this…
We identify a choiceless variation of the box game paradox, in which players predict unknown real numbers with near-perfect accuracy despite lacking any useful information. We also verify that choice is necessary in the solution of the…
We unify standard frameworks for approachability both in full or partial monitoring by defining a new abstract game, called the "purely informative game", where the outcome at each stage is the maximal information players can obtain,…
Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…