Related papers: Efficient Defection: Overage-Proportional Rationin…
This paper designs a distributed stochastic annealing algorithm for non-convex cooperative aggregative games, whose agents' cost functions not only depend on agents' own decision variables but also rely on the sum of agents' decision…
We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner's dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended co-evolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria,…
We introduce nonlinear attractive effects into a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players located on a square lattice can either cooperate with their nearest neighbors or defect. In every generation, each player updates its…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the…
According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing a higher payoff can spread among competitors. But there are cases when a player consistently overestimates or underestimates her own payoff, which undermines…
Darwin's theory of evolution - as introduced in game theory by Maynard Smith - is not the only important evolutionary aspect in a evolutionary dynamics, since complex interdependencies, competition, and growth should be modeled by, for…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Nash equilibria are defined using uncorrelated behavioural or mixed joint probability distributions effectively assuming that players of bounded rationality must discard information to locate equilibria. We propose instead that rational…
Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that aligning the agents' preferences with the system-level…
We propose a notion of a stable partition in a coalitional game that is parametrized by the concept of a defection function. This function assigns to each partition of the grand coalition a set of different coalition arrangements for a…
This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the…
Evidential cooperation in large worlds (ECL) refers to the idea that humans and other agents can benefit by cooperating with similar agents with differing values in causally disconnected parts of a large universe. Cooperating provides…
This paper considers a non-cooperative game in which competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel selfishly optimize their power allocation in order to improve their achievable rates. Previously, it was shown that a…
The use of orthogonal signaling schemes such as time-, frequency-, or code-division multiplexing (T-, F-, CDM) in multi-user systems allows for power-efficient simple receivers. It is shown in this paper that by using orthogonal signaling…
This paper considers the competitive resource allocation problem in Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) interfering channels, when users maximize their energy efficiency. Considering each transmitter-receiver pair as a selfish player,…
We consider a strategic game, where players submit jobs to a machine that executes all jobs in a way that minimizes energy while respecting the given deadlines. The energy consumption is then charged to the players in some way. Each player…
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and…
We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson and Wilkie showed that side contracting can backfire: even a…
Cooperation is an important research object in economics, sociology, and biology, and the evolution of cooperation in structured populations is a interesting research topic. We mainly focus on the evolution of cooperation with two-order and…
According to the standard protocol of spatial public goods game, a cooperator player invests not only into his own game but also into the games organized by neighboring partners. In this work, we relax this assumption by allowing…