Related papers: Efficient Defection: Overage-Proportional Rationin…
Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is…
In a recent Letter [F.C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco Phys. Rev. Lett. \textbf{95}, 098104 (2005)], the scale-free networks are found to be advantageous for the emergence of cooperation. In the present work an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma…
Cooperation is the backbone of modern human societies, making it a priority to understand how successful cooperation-sustaining mechanisms operate. Cyclic dominance, a non-transitive setup comprising at least three strategies wherein the…
We consider the dynamic behavior of several variants of the Network Creation Game, introduced by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03]. Equilibrium networks in these models have desirable properties like low social cost and small diameter, which makes…
In multi-rate IEEE 802.11 WLANs, the traditional user association based on the strongest received signal and the well known anomaly of the MAC protocol can lead to overloaded Access Points (APs), and poor or heterogeneous performance. Our…
Cooperative games are an important class of problems in game theory, where the goal is to distribute a value among a set of players who are allowed to cooperate by forming coalitions. An outcome of the game is given by an allocation vector…
How cooperation emerges in human societies is still a puzzle. Evolutionary game theory has been the standard framework to address this issue. In most models, every individual plays with all others, and then reproduce and die according to…
Cooperation in evolutionary biology means paying a cost, c, to enjoy benefits, b. A defector is one who does not pay any cost but enjoys the benefits of cooperators. Human societies, especially, have evolved a strategy to discourage…
The paper studies the routing in the network shared by several users. Each user seeks to optimize either its own performance or some combination between its own performance and that of other users, by controlling the routing of its given…
We consider a cooperative game defined by an economic lot-sizing problem with heterogeneous costs over a finite time horizon, in which each firm faces demand for a single product in each period and coalitions can pool orders. The model of…
We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…
We formulate the resource allocation problem for the uplink of code division multiple access (CDMA) networks using a game theoretic framework, propose an efficient and distributed algorithm for a joint rate and power allocation, and show…
Altruistic cooperation is costly yet socially desirable. As a result, agents struggle to learn cooperative policies through independent reinforcement learning (RL). Indirect reciprocity, where agents consider their interaction partner's…
In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is…
Cooperation is beneficial for the species as a whole, but, at the level of an individual, defection pays off. Natural selection is then expected to favor defectors and eliminate cooperation. This prediction is in stark contrast with the…
In the framework of transferable utility coalitional games, a scoring (characteristic) function determines the value of any subset/coalition of agents. Agents decide on both which coalitions to form and the allocations of the values of the…
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy.…
We consider interactions between players in groups of size $d\geq2$ with payoffs that not only depend on the strategies used in the group but also fluctuate at random over time. An individual can adopt either cooperation or defection as…
In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in…
Coordination is a desirable feature in many multi-agent systems such as robotic and socioeconomic networks. We consider a task allocation problem as a binary networked coordination game over an undirected regular graph. Each agent in the…